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Single Idea 8453

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names ]

Full Idea

Since one wants to say that real numbers exist and yet one cannot name each of them, it is not unreasonable to relinquish the connection between naming an object and making an existence claim about it.

Gist of Idea

If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers

Source

Willard Quine (works [1961]), quoted by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.2

Book Ref

Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.27

A Reaction

One could say that same about people, such as 'the most recent citizen of Brazil'. Some sort of successful reference seems to be needed, such as 'the next prime beyond the biggest so far found'. Depends what your predicate is going to be.

The 29 ideas from 'works'

13736 Quinean metaphysics just lists the beings, which is a domain with no internal structure [Schaffer,J on Quine]
3302 Set theory is full of Platonist metaphysics, so Quine aimed to keep it separate from logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
10211 Quine wants V = L for a cleaner theory, despite the scepticism of most theorists [Quine, by Shapiro]
3336 Two things can never entail three things [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
8453 If we had to name objects to make existence claims, we couldn't discuss all the real numbers [Quine]
10311 No sense can be made of quantification into opaque contexts [Quine, by Hale]
10538 Finite quantification can be eliminated in favour of disjunction and conjunction [Quine, by Dummett]
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
3751 Universals are acceptable if they are needed to make an accepted theory true [Quine, by Jacquette]
8466 For Quine, intuitionist ontology is inadequate for classical mathematics [Quine, by Orenstein]
8467 Intuitionists only admit numbers properly constructed, but classical maths covers all reals in a 'limit' [Quine, by Orenstein]
15782 Quine wants identity and individuation-conditions for possibilia [Quine, by Lycan]
10667 A logically perfect language could express all truths, so all truths must be logically expressible [Quine, by Hossack]
3325 For Quine everything exists theoretically, as reference, predication and quantification [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
16021 Quine says we can expand predicates easily (ideology), but not names (ontology) [Quine, by Noonan]
8534 Quine says the predicate of a true statement has no ontological implications [Quine, by Armstrong]
10295 Quine suggests that properties can be replaced with extensional entities like sets [Quine, by Shapiro]
3322 Quine says that if second-order logic is to quantify over properties, that can be done in first-order predicate logic [Quine, by Benardete,JA]
6078 Quine brought classes into semantics to get rid of properties [Quine, by McGinn]
8479 Don't analyse 'red is a colour' as involving properties. Say 'all red things are coloured things' [Quine, by Orenstein]
15783 Definite descriptions can't unambiguously pick out an object which doesn't exist [Lycan on Quine]
2796 For Quine the only way to know a necessity is empirically [Quine, by Dancy,J]
8450 Quine's empiricism is based on whole theoretical systems, not on single mental events [Quine, by Orenstein]
3868 To proclaim cultural relativism is to thereby rise above it [Quine, by Newton-Smith]
4713 For Quine, theories are instruments used to make predictions about observations [Quine, by O'Grady]
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
7330 The principle of charity only applies to the logical constants [Quine, by Miller,A]
17862 Essence gives an illusion of understanding [Quine, by Almog]
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]