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Single Idea 8465
[filed under theme 4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
]
Full Idea
The theory of mereology has had a history of being exploited by nominalists to achieve some of the effects of set theory.
Gist of Idea
Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory
Source
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.55
A Reaction
Some writers refer to mereology as a 'theory', and others as an area of study. This appears to be an interesting line of investigation. Orenstein says Quine and Goodman showed its limitations.
The
14 ideas
from 'W.V. Quine'
8452
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Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims
[Orenstein]
|
8454
|
The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc.
[Orenstein]
|
8457
|
The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs
[Orenstein]
|
8458
|
Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism
[Orenstein]
|
8471
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Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way
[Orenstein]
|
8465
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Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory
[Orenstein]
|
8474
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Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete
[Orenstein]
|
8476
|
Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role
[Orenstein]
|
8472
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Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable)
[Orenstein]
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8473
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The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic
[Orenstein]
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8475
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The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance
[Orenstein]
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8477
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People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference
[Orenstein]
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8484
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If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions
[Orenstein]
|
8480
|
S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p'
[Orenstein]
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