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Single Idea 8470

[filed under theme 19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories ]

Full Idea

For Quine, we cannot sensibly ask which is the real number five, the Frege-Russell set or the Von Neumann one. There is no arithmetical or empirical way of deciding between the two. Reference is inscrutable.

Gist of Idea

Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers

Source

report of Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3

Book Ref

Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.68

A Reaction

To generalise from a problem of reference in the highly abstract world of arithmetic, and say that all reference is inscrutable, strikes me as implausible.

The 29 ideas with the same theme [way language-terms connect with things in reality]:

1757 The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
21399 Referring to a person, and speaking about him, are very different [Seneca]
23646 Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid]
7634 Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund]
4981 The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege]
4567 Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE]
4145 How do words refer to sensations? [Wittgenstein]
8470 Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein]
4712 Quine says there is no matter of fact about reference - it is 'inscrutable' [Quine, by O'Grady]
18898 In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers]
6271 How reference is specified is not what reference is [Putnam]
2562 A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty]
6388 Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson]
6390 With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson]
4566 Any thesis about reference is also a thesis about what exists to be referred to [Cooper,DE]
4571 Reference need not be a hit-or-miss affair [Cooper,DE]
12642 Co-referring terms differ if they have different causal powers [Fodor]
12663 We refer to individuals and to properties, and we use singular terms and predicates [Fodor]
10446 Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach]
10447 We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach]
10443 You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach]
13885 If apparent reference can mislead, then so can apparent lack of reference [Wright,C]
4995 Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R]
9336 A concept's reference is what makes true the beliefs of its possession conditions [Peacocke, by Horwich]
18886 Frege's 'sense' solves four tricky puzzles [Salmon,N]
22244 'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Field,H, by Recanati]
21615 References to the 'greatest prime number' have no reference, but are meaningful [Williamson]
16356 There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati]
12791 It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock]