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Full Idea
For Quine, we cannot sensibly ask which is the real number five, the Frege-Russell set or the Von Neumann one. There is no arithmetical or empirical way of deciding between the two. Reference is inscrutable.
Gist of Idea
Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers
Source
report of Willard Quine (Ontological Relativity [1968]) by Alex Orenstein - W.V. Quine Ch.3
Book Ref
Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.68
A Reaction
To generalise from a problem of reference in the highly abstract world of arithmetic, and say that all reference is inscrutable, strikes me as implausible.
| 8470 | Reference is inscrutable, because we cannot choose between theories of numbers [Quine, by Orenstein] |
| 18963 | Indeterminacy translating 'rabbit' depends on translating individuation terms [Quine] |
| 1633 | Absolute ontological questions are meaningless, because the answers are circular definitions [Quine] |
| 18964 | Ontology is relative to both a background theory and a translation manual [Quine] |
| 18965 | We know what things are by distinguishing them, so identity is part of ontology [Quine] |
| 21642 | If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine] |
| 1634 | Two things are relative - the background theory, and translating the object theory into the background theory [Quine] |