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Single Idea 8471
[filed under theme 19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
]
Full Idea
'Socrates is human' is true if 1) subject referent is identical with a predicate referent (Nominalism), 2) subject reference member of the predicate set, or the subject has that property (Platonism), 3) predicate set a member of the subject set (Montague)
Gist of Idea
Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way
Source
Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.3)
Book Ref
Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.70
A Reaction
Orenstein offers these as alternatives to Quine's 'inscrutability of reference' thesis, which makes the sense unanalysable.
The
14 ideas
from Alex Orenstein
8452
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Traditionally, universal sentences had existential import, but were later treated as conditional claims
[Orenstein]
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8454
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The whole numbers are 'natural'; 'rational' numbers include fractions; the 'reals' include root-2 etc.
[Orenstein]
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8457
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The Principle of Conservatism says we should violate the minimum number of background beliefs
[Orenstein]
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8458
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Just individuals in Nominalism; add sets for Extensionalism; add properties, concepts etc for Intensionalism
[Orenstein]
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8471
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Three ways for 'Socrates is human' to be true are nominalist, platonist, or Montague's way
[Orenstein]
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8465
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Mereology has been exploited by some nominalists to achieve the effects of set theory
[Orenstein]
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8474
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Unlike elementary logic, set theory is not complete
[Orenstein]
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8472
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Sentential logic is consistent (no contradictions) and complete (entirely provable)
[Orenstein]
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8476
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Axiomatization simply picks from among the true sentences a few to play a special role
[Orenstein]
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8473
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The logicists held that is-a-member-of is a logical constant, making set theory part of logic
[Orenstein]
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8475
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The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance
[Orenstein]
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8477
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People presume meanings exist because they confuse meaning and reference
[Orenstein]
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8484
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If two people believe the same proposition, this implies the existence of propositions
[Orenstein]
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8480
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S4: 'poss that poss that p' implies 'poss that p'; S5: 'poss that nec that p' implies 'nec that p'
[Orenstein]
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