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Single Idea 8475

[filed under theme 5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification ]

Full Idea

The substitution view of quantification explains 'there-is-an-x-such-that x is a man' as true when it has a true substitution instance, as in the case of 'Socrates is a man', so the quantifier can be read as 'it is sometimes true that'.

Gist of Idea

The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance

Source

Alex Orenstein (W.V. Quine [2002], Ch.5)

Book Ref

Orenstein,Alex: 'W.V. Quine' [Princeton 2002], p.103

A Reaction

The word 'true' crops up twice here. The alternative (existential-referential) view cites objects, so the substitution view is a more linguistic approach.

The 23 ideas with the same theme [quantifiers range over expressions instead of objects]:

9874 Contradiction arises from Frege's substitutional account of second-order quantification [Dummett on Frege]
10800 The values of variables can't determine existence, because they are just expressions [Ryle, by Quine]
21642 If quantification is all substitutional, there is no ontology [Quine]
9025 You can't base quantification on substituting names for variables, if the irrationals cannot all be named [Quine]
9026 Some quantifications could be false substitutionally and true objectually, because of nameless objects [Quine]
10801 Either reference really matters, or we don't need to replace it with substitutions [Quine]
10793 Quine thought substitutional quantification confused use and mention, but then saw its nominalist appeal [Quine, by Marcus (Barcan)]
10785 Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)]
10795 Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)]
10798 A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)]
10009 Substitutional quantification is just a variant of Tarski's account [Wallace, by Baldwin]
10792 The substitutional quantifier is not in competition with the standard interpretation [Kripke, by Marcus (Barcan)]
18123 Substitutional quantification is just standard if all objects in the domain have a name [Bostock]
9469 Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C]
9468 On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C]
15533 We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names [Lewis]
9465 Substitutional universal quantification retains truth for substitution of terms of the same type [Jacquette]
9466 Nominalists like substitutional quantification to avoid the metaphysics of objects [Jacquette]
12222 Substitutional quantification is referential quantification over expressions [Fine,K]
13674 We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro]
15136 Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
8475 The substitution view of quantification says a sentence is true when there is a substitution instance [Orenstein]
17988 Quantification can't all be substitutional; some reference is obviously to objects [Hofweber]