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Single Idea 8489

[filed under theme 9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 3. Objects in Thought ]

Full Idea

I regard a regular definition of 'object' as impossible, since it is too simple to admit of logical analysis. Briefly: an object is anything that is not a function, so that an expression for it does not contain any empty place.

Gist of Idea

The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place

Source

Gottlob Frege (Function and Concept [1891], p.32)

Book Ref

Frege,Gottlob: 'Translations from the Writings of Gottlob Frege', ed/tr. Geach,P/Black,M [Blackwell 1980], p.32


A Reaction

Here is the core of the programme for deriving our ontology from our logic and language, followed through by Russell and Quine. Once we extend objects beyond the physical, it becomes incredibly hard to individuate them.


The 13 ideas from 'Function and Concept'

Frege thought traditional categories had psychological and linguistic impurities [Frege, by Rumfitt]
Frege takes the existence of horses to be part of their concept [Frege, by Sommers]
Frege allows either too few properties (as extensions) or too many (as predicates) [Mellor/Oliver on Frege]
Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Unlike objects, concepts are inherently incomplete [Frege, by George/Velleman]
An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object [Frege, by Hale]
I may regard a thought about Phosphorus as true, and the same thought about Hesperus as false [Frege]
A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value [Frege]
Arithmetic is a development of logic, so arithmetical symbolism must expand into logical symbolism [Frege]
The concept 'object' is too simple for analysis; unlike a function, it is an expression with no empty place [Frege]
First-level functions have objects as arguments; second-level functions take functions as arguments [Frege]
The Ontological Argument fallaciously treats existence as a first-level concept [Frege]
Relations are functions with two arguments [Frege]