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Single Idea 8497

[filed under theme 7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / d. Commitment of theories ]

Full Idea

Our acceptance of ontology is similar in principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory; we adopt the simplest conceptual scheme into which the disordered fragments of raw experience can be fitted and arranged.

Gist of Idea

An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences

Source

Willard Quine (On What There Is [1948], p.16)

Book Ref

Quine,Willard: 'From a Logical Point of View' [Harper and Row 1963], p.16

A Reaction

Quine (who says he likes 'desert landscapes') is the modern hero for anyone who loves Ockham's Razor, and seeks extreme simplicity. And yet he finds himself committed to the existence of sets to achieve this.

The 29 ideas from 'On What There Is'

8455 Canonical notation needs quantification, variables and predicates, but not names [Quine, by Orenstein]
8456 Quine extended Russell's defining away of definite descriptions, to also define away names [Quine, by Orenstein]
10241 For Quine, there is only one way to exist [Quine, by Shapiro]
4064 The idea of a thing and the idea of existence are two sides of the same coin [Quine, by Crane]
19277 Quine rests existence on bound variables, because he thinks singular terms can be analysed away [Quine, by Hale]
12210 Quine's ontology is wrong; his question is scientific, and his answer is partly philosophical [Fine,K on Quine]
8459 Fictional quantification has no ontology, so we study ontology through scientific theories [Quine, by Orenstein]
16261 If commitment rests on first-order logic, we obviously lose the ontology concerning predication [Maudlin on Quine]
4443 Quine has argued that predicates do not have any ontological commitment [Quine, by Armstrong]
1619 There is an attempt to give a verificationist account of meaning, without the error of reducing everything to sensations [Dennett on Quine]
19159 Quine relates predicates to their objects, by being 'true of' them [Quine, by Davidson]
8856 Quine's indispensability argument said arguments for abstracta were a posteriori [Quine, by Yablo]
7698 If to be is to be the value of a variable, we must already know the values available [Jacquette on Quine]
15402 There is no entity called 'redness', and that some things are red is ultimate and irreducible [Quine]
1617 The word 'meaning' is only useful when talking about significance or about synonymy [Quine]
1609 I do not believe there is some abstract entity called a 'meaning' which we can 'have' [Quine]
1611 Names can be converted to descriptions, and Russell showed how to eliminate those [Quine]
1610 To be is to be the value of a variable, which amounts to being in the range of reference of a pronoun [Quine]
1615 Intuitionism says classes are invented, and abstract entities are constructed from specified ingredients [Quine]
1614 Conceptualism holds that there are universals but they are mind-made [Quine]
1612 Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
1613 Logicists cheerfully accept reference to bound variables and all sorts of abstract entities [Quine]
1616 Formalism says maths is built of meaningless notations; these build into rules which have meaning [Quine]
1618 We study bound variables not to know reality, but to know what reality language asserts [Quine]
8496 What actually exists does not, of course, depend on language [Quine]
8497 An ontology is like a scientific theory; we accept the simplest scheme that fits disorderly experiences [Quine]
8498 Treating scattered sensations as single objects simplifies our understanding of experience [Quine]
18209 We can never translate our whole language of objects into phenomenalism [Quine]
12443 Can an unactualized possible have self-identity, and be distinct from other possibles? [Quine]