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Full Idea
It is not always possible for nominalists to translate all statements putatively about universals as statements about particulars. It is not possible for 'red is a colour' and 'red resembles pink more than blue'
Gist of Idea
Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars
Source
Frank Jackson (Statements about Universals [1977], p.89)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.89
A Reaction
His second example strikes me as the biggest challenge facing nominalism. I wish they wouldn't use secondary qualities as examples. I am unconvinced that the existence of universals will improve the explanation. It's a mystery.
22125 | Duns Scotus was a realist about universals [Duns Scotus, by Dumont] |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
4446 | It is claimed that some universals are not exemplified by any particular, so must exist separately [Armstrong] |
15729 | Uninstantiated properties must be defined using the instantiated ones [Quinton] |
8499 | Nominalists cannot translate 'red resembles pink more than blue' into particulars [Jackson] |
7962 | Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver] |
10727 | Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver] |
8962 | 'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz] |
8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
4452 | Maybe universals are real, if properties themselves have properties, and relate to other properties [Moreland] |
4467 | A naturalist and realist about universals is forced to say redness can be both moving and stationary [Moreland] |
4469 | There are spatial facts about red particulars, but not about redness itself [Moreland] |
4468 | How could 'being even', or 'being a father', or a musical interval, exist naturally in space? [Moreland] |