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Single Idea 8501

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta ]

Full Idea

For 'a and b have the same property, F-ness' the Quinean Nominalist has a paraphrase to hand: 'a and b are both F'. ..In denying that this object need have properties, the Quinean is not denying that it really is F.

Gist of Idea

Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have

Source

Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.95)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.95

A Reaction

The question that remains is why 'F' is used of both a and b. We don't call a and b 'a', because they are different. Quine falls back on resemblance. I suspect Quineans of hiding behind the semantics.

The 15 ideas from Michael Devitt

17371 Some kinds are very explanatory, but others less so, and some not at all [Devitt]
17372 The higher categories are not natural kinds, so the Linnaean hierarchy should be given up [Devitt]
17373 Species pluralism says there are several good accounts of what a species is [Devitt]
8501 Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt]
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
8503 The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt]
17369 We name species as small to share properties, but large enough to yield generalisations [Devitt]
17370 Things that gradually change, like species, can still have essences [Devitt]
17367 Species are phenetic, biological, niche, or phylogenetic-cladistic [Devitt, by PG]
17368 Essentialism concerns the nature of a group, not its category [Devitt]
9354 Why should necessities only be knowable a priori? That Hesperus is Phosporus is known empirically [Devitt]
9353 We explain away a priori knowledge, not as directly empirical, but as indirectly holistically empirical [Devitt]
9356 The idea of the a priori is so obscure that it won't explain anything [Devitt]
19564 Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
19565 How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]