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Full Idea
Talk of 'particulars' and 'universals' clutters the landscape without adding to our understanding. We should rest with the basic fact that a is F.
Gist of Idea
The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic
Source
Michael Devitt ('Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? [1980], p.98)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.98
A Reaction
Ramsey was first to challenge the basic distinction. I find the approach of Quine and Devitt unsatisfactory. We abandon explanation when it is totally hopeless, but that is usually in the face of complexity. Properties are difficult but simple.
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 8502 | Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt] |
| 8503 | The particular/universal distinction is unhelpful clutter; we should accept 'a is F' as basic [Devitt] |