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Single Idea 8504

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Quine is not an 'ostrich', because his strategy for dealing with property sentences is clear enough: all talk of attributes is to be dispensed with in favour of talk of eternal open sentences or talk of classes.

Gist of Idea

Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes

Source

report of Willard Quine (Word and Object [1960], §43) by Michael Devitt - 'Ostrich Nominalism' or 'Mirage Realism'? p.100

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.100

A Reaction

[See p.209 'Word and Object'] The proposal seems to be that a property like being-human (a category) would be dealt with by classes, and qualitative properties would be dealt with simply as predicates. I like the split, and the first half, not the second.

The 17 ideas with the same theme [universals are classes of things]:

18442 You only know an attribute if you know what things have it [Quine]
8504 Quine aims to deal with properties by the use of eternal open sentences, or classes [Quine, by Devitt]
7970 Quine is committed to sets, but is more a Class Nominalist than a Platonist [Quine, by Macdonald,C]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
18371 The class of similar things is much too big a truthmaker for the feature of a particular [Armstrong]
4436 'Class Nominalism' may explain properties if we stick to 'natural' sets, and ignore random ones [Armstrong]
4434 'Class Nominalism' says that properties or kinds are merely membership of a set (e.g. of white things) [Armstrong]
4435 'Class Nominalism' cannot explain co-extensive properties, or sets with random members [Armstrong]
8550 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
20339 Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim]
15438 We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism [Lewis]
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]
7032 Objects join sets because of properties; the property is not bestowed by set membership [Heil]
4233 If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
4471 We should abandon the concept of a property since (unlike sets) their identity conditions are unclear [Moreland]
14597 Natural Class Nominalism says there are primitive classes of things resembling in one respect [Dorr]