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Single Idea 8521
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
]
Full Idea
The objection to nominalism is its consequence that if there were no human race (or other living things), nothing would be like anything else.
Gist of Idea
Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
Source
Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §6)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.133
A Reaction
Anti-realists will be unflustered by this difficulty. Personally it strikes me as obvious that some aspects of resemblance are part of reality which we did not contribute. This I take to be a contingent fact, founded on the existence of natural kinds.
The
23 ideas
with the same theme
[universals are groups of resembling particulars]:
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5015
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A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another
[Descartes]
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6714
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Universals do not have any intrinsic properties, but only relations to particulars
[Berkeley]
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11098
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Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance
[Hume, by Quine]
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7954
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If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences
[Hume]
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23649
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No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white
[Reid]
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4441
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'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal
[Russell]
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7956
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If all and only red things were round things, we would need to specify the 'respect' of the resemblance
[Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
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7957
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Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together
[Goodman, by Macdonald,C]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
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4439
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'Resemblance Nominalism' says properties are resemblances between classes of particulars
[Armstrong]
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4440
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'Resemblance Nominalism' finds that in practice the construction of resemblance classes is hard
[Armstrong]
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8500
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Colour resemblance isn't just resemblance between things; 'colour' must be mentioned
[Jackson]
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8521
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Nominalism has the problem that without humans nothing would resemble anything else
[Campbell,K]
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7009
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Similarity among modes will explain everthing universals were for
[Heil]
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7041
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Similar objects have similar properties; properties are directly similar
[Heil]
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7720
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Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal
[Lowe]
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9447
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If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees
[Mumford]
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4458
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Unlike Class Nominalism, Resemblance Nominalism can distinguish natural from unnatural classes
[Moreland]
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9472
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Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common
[Bird]
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7955
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Resemblance Nominalism cannot explain either new resemblances, or absence of resemblances
[Macdonald,C]
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18435
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Resemblance Nominalists say that resemblance explains properties (not the other way round)
[Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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18436
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Entities are truthmakers for their resemblances, so no extra entities or 'resemblances' are needed
[Rodriquez-Pereyra]
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18437
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Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson'
[Edwards]
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