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Single Idea 8523

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes ]

Full Idea

The 'problem of imperfect community' cannot arise where our resemblance sets are sets of tropes. Tropes, by their very nature and mode of differentiation can only resemble in one respect.

Clarification

See Idea 7957 for Goodman's problem of Imperfect Community

Gist of Idea

Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect

Source

Keith Campbell (The Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars [1981], §6)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.135

A Reaction

You arrive at very different accounts of what resemblance means according to how you express the problem verbally. We can only find a solution through thinking which transcends language. Heresy!

Related Idea

Idea 7957 Without respects of resemblance, we would collect blue book, blue pen, red pen, red clock together [Goodman, by Macdonald,C]

The 36 ideas with the same theme [the principles and concepts of trope theory]:

8511 Stout first explicitly proposed that properties and relations are particulars [Stout,GF, by Campbell,K]
8508 A 'trope' is an abstract particular, the occurrence of an essence [Williams,DC]
8509 A world is completely constituted by its tropes and their connections [Williams,DC]
8510 'Socrates is wise' means a concurrence sum contains a member of a similarity set [Williams,DC]
15483 Properties are ways particular things are, and so they are tied to the identity of their possessor [Martin,CB]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
18373 If tropes are non-transferable, then they necessarily belong to their particular substance [Armstrong]
4444 One moderate nominalist view says that properties and relations exist, but they are particulars [Armstrong]
9657 You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it [Lewis]
15433 Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates [Lewis]
8513 Two red cloths are separate instances of redness, because you can dye one of them blue [Campbell,K]
8514 Red could only recur in a variety of objects if it was many, which makes them particulars [Campbell,K]
8522 Tropes solve the Companionship Difficulty, since the resemblance is only between abstract particulars [Campbell,K]
8523 Tropes solve the Imperfect Community problem, as they can only resemble in one respect [Campbell,K]
8524 Trope theory makes space central to reality, as tropes must have a shape and size [Campbell,K]
11928 Are tropes transferable? If they are, that is a version of Platonism [Molnar]
8526 We might treat both tropes and substances as fundamental, so we can't presume it is just tropes [Daly]
10738 Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
10739 The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
10740 The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
10741 Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
7042 A theory of universals says similarity is identity of parts; for modes, similarity is primitive [Heil]
10464 A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John]
10465 Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John]
10467 Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John]
8285 I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe]
4234 Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
4235 Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
4236 Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
4461 Tropes are like Hume's 'impressions', conceived as real rather than as ideal [Moreland]
18431 Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards]
14605 Tropes are the same as events [Schaffer,J]
7934 Tropes are abstract (two can occupy the same place), but not universals (they have locations) [Macdonald,C]
7958 Properties are sets of exactly resembling property-particulars [Macdonald,C]
7972 Tropes are abstract particulars, not concrete particulars, so the theory is not nominalist [Macdonald,C]
18864 The wisdom of Plato and of Socrates are not the same property [Tallant]