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Full Idea
The great deniers of properties and relations are of two sorts: those who put their faith in predicates and those who appeal to sets (classes).
Gist of Idea
Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
Source
David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.161
A Reaction
This ignores the Quine view, which is strictly for ostriches. Put like this, properties and relations seem undeniable. Predicates are too numerous (gerrymandering) or too few (colour shades). Classes can have arbitrary members.
| 17619 | We renounce all abstract entities [Goodman/Quine] |
| 8529 | Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong] |
| 8501 | Quineans take predication about objects as basic, not reference to properties they may have [Devitt] |
| 8858 | Philosophers keep finding unexpected objects, like models, worlds, functions, numbers, events, sets, properties [Yablo] |
| 4478 | Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux] |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| 7971 | Real Nominalism is only committed to concrete particulars, word-tokens, and (possibly) sets [Macdonald,C] |
| 14596 | Call 'nominalism' the denial of numbers, properties, relations and sets [Dorr] |
| 19122 | Nominalists can reduce theories of properties or sets to harmless axiomatic truth theories [Halbach/Leigh] |