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Single Idea 8531
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
]
Full Idea
Most sets are uninteresting because they are utterly heterogeneous, that is, the members have nothing in common. For most sets there is no common property F, such that the set is the set of all the Fs.
Gist of Idea
In most sets there is no property common to all the members
Source
David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §1)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.161
A Reaction
One might link the interesting sets together by resemblance, without invoking the actual existence of an item F which all the members carry (like freemasons' briefcases). Personally I am only really interested in 'natural' sets.
The
17 ideas
from 'Properties'
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4036
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What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities
[Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
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8533
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Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
[Armstrong]
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4035
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There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
[Armstrong]
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4034
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Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
[Armstrong]
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8535
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To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
[Armstrong]
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8529
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Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
[Armstrong]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
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8530
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Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
[Armstrong]
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8536
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We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
[Armstrong]
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8531
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In most sets there is no property common to all the members
[Armstrong]
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8537
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Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
[Armstrong]
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8538
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Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
[Armstrong]
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8539
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Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
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8541
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Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability
[Armstrong]
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8540
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The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
[Armstrong]
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15754
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Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
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15753
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Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
[Armstrong]
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