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Single Idea 8538

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes ]

Full Idea

Trope theory needs extra ontological baggage, the Axioms of Resemblance. There is a principle of symmetry, and there is the failure of transitivity - except in the special case of exact resemblance.

Gist of Idea

Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.171


A Reaction

[see text for fuller detail] Is it appropriate to describe such axioms as 'ontological' baggage? Interesting, though I suspect that any account of properties and predicates will have a similar baggage of commitments.


The 22 ideas with the same theme [arguments against the existence of tropes]:

Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford]
Objects are not bundles of tropes (which are ways things are, not parts of things) [Martin,CB]
Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
If properties and relations are particulars, there is still the problem of how to classify and group them [Armstrong]
Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity [Lewis]
Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates [Lewis]
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes [Lewis]
More than one trope (even identical ones!) can occupy the same location [Daly]
If tropes are linked by the existence of concurrence, a special relation is needed to link them all [Daly]
Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil]
If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]
Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe]
Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe]
How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe]
Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe]
Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe]
If tropes are in space and time, in what sense are they abstract? [Oderberg]
A colour-trope cannot be simple (as required), because it is spread in space, and so it is complex [Moreland]
In 'four colours were used in the decoration', colours appear to be universals, not tropes [Moreland]
How do a group of resembling tropes all resemble one another in the same way? [Macdonald,C]
Trope Nominalism is the only nominalism to introduce new entities, inviting Ockham's Razor [Macdonald,C]