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Single Idea 8538

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes ]

Full Idea

Trope theory needs extra ontological baggage, the Axioms of Resemblance. There is a principle of symmetry, and there is the failure of transitivity - except in the special case of exact resemblance.

Gist of Idea

Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact

Source

David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.171

A Reaction

[see text for fuller detail] Is it appropriate to describe such axioms as 'ontological' baggage? Interesting, though I suspect that any account of properties and predicates will have a similar baggage of commitments.

The 17 ideas from 'Properties'

4036 What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities [Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
8533 Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply [Armstrong]
4035 There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects [Armstrong]
4034 Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature [Armstrong]
8535 To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate [Armstrong]
8529 Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes [Armstrong]
8532 Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties [Armstrong]
8530 Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold' [Armstrong]
8536 We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates [Armstrong]
8531 In most sets there is no property common to all the members [Armstrong]
8537 Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive [Armstrong]
8538 Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact [Armstrong]
8539 Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature [Armstrong]
8541 Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability [Armstrong]
8540 The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue' [Armstrong]
15754 Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature [Armstrong]
15753 Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined [Armstrong]