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Single Idea 8539
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
]
Full Idea
A reason why I reject trope theory is that universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature.
Gist of Idea
Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
Source
David M. Armstrong (Properties [1992], §2)
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.171
A Reaction
This is the key thought in Armstrong's defence of universals. Issues about universals may well be decided on such large playing fields. I think he is probably wrong, and I will gradually explain why. Watch this space as the story unfolds...
The
17 ideas
from 'Properties'
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4036
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What matters is not how many entities we postulate, but how many kinds of entities
[Armstrong, by Mellor/Oliver]
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8533
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Predicates need ontological correlates to ensure that they apply
[Armstrong]
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4035
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There must be some explanation of why certain predicates are applicable to certain objects
[Armstrong]
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4034
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Whether we apply 'cold' or 'hot' to an object is quite separate from its change of temperature
[Armstrong]
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8535
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To the claim that every predicate has a property, start by eliminating failure of application of predicate
[Armstrong]
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8529
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Deniers of properties and relations rely on either predicates or on classes
[Armstrong]
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8532
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Resemblances must be in certain 'respects', and they seem awfully like properties
[Armstrong]
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8530
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Change of temperature in objects is quite independent of the predicates 'hot' and 'cold'
[Armstrong]
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8536
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We want to know what constituents of objects are grounds for the application of predicates
[Armstrong]
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8531
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In most sets there is no property common to all the members
[Armstrong]
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8537
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Tropes fall into classes, because exact similarity is symmetrical and transitive
[Armstrong]
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8538
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Trope theory needs extra commitments, to symmetry and non-transitivity, unless resemblance is exact
[Armstrong]
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8539
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Universals are required to give a satisfactory account of the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
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8541
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Regularities theories are poor on causal connections, counterfactuals and probability
[Armstrong]
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8540
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The introduction of sparse properties avoids the regularity theory's problem with 'grue'
[Armstrong]
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15754
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Without properties we would be unable to express the laws of nature
[Armstrong]
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15753
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Essences might support Resemblance Nominalism, but they are too coarse and ill-defined
[Armstrong]
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