more on this theme
|
more from this thinker
Single Idea 8545
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
]
Full Idea
My account of properties concerns those with respect to which change is possible; it is not intended to apply to such properties of numbers as being even and being prime.
Gist of Idea
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers
Source
Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §02)
Book Ref
Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.209
A Reaction
You could argue that while these properties may not cause change, they are abstract powers. Being even allows division by 2, and being prime blocks it. I say patterns are the basis, and dividing groups of physical objects is involved.
The
33 ideas
from 'Causality and Properties'
9485
|
Universals concern how things are, and how they could be
[Shoemaker, by Bird]
|
12678
|
Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional
[Shoemaker, by Ellis]
|
8542
|
If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved
[Shoemaker]
|
8543
|
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
[Shoemaker]
|
8545
|
A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers
[Shoemaker]
|
15756
|
Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things
[Shoemaker]
|
15758
|
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties
[Shoemaker]
|
8547
|
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties
[Shoemaker]
|
15757
|
'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional
[Shoemaker]
|
8548
|
Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties
[Shoemaker]
|
8550
|
Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same
[Shoemaker]
|
15761
|
We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions
[Shoemaker]
|
15759
|
The identity of a property concerns its causal powers
[Shoemaker]
|
15760
|
Properties are clusters of conditional powers
[Shoemaker]
|
8549
|
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects
[Shoemaker]
|
15762
|
Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing?
[Shoemaker]
|
8552
|
If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination
[Shoemaker]
|
8551
|
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
[Shoemaker]
|
8555
|
There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity
[Shoemaker]
|
8554
|
Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world
[Shoemaker]
|
8553
|
It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality
[Shoemaker]
|
8557
|
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
[Shoemaker]
|
8556
|
Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential
[Shoemaker]
|
4040
|
The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts
[Shoemaker]
|
8558
|
One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance
[Shoemaker]
|
8559
|
Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction
[Shoemaker]
|
8560
|
If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds
[Shoemaker]
|
15763
|
If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity
[Shoemaker]
|
8561
|
If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties
[Shoemaker]
|
15764
|
'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know?
[Shoemaker]
|
8562
|
It is possible to conceive what is not possible
[Shoemaker]
|
15765
|
Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects
[Shoemaker]
|
15092
|
Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation
[Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]
|