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Single Idea 8547

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 3. Powers as Derived ]

Full Idea

It is possible to have the same power (e.g. being poisonous) in virtue of having very different properties. ..So it is in virtue of a thing's properties that the thing has the powers that it has.

Gist of Idea

One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties

Source

Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §03)

Book Ref

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.211


A Reaction

This strikes me as an accurate and helpful picture. It means that true properties give rise to powers, and categorial or relational or whimsical properties must have their ontological status judged by that standard.


The 23 ideas with the same theme [powers as products of something more basic]:

A power is not a cause, but an aptitude for a cause [Zabarella]
All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes]
The complete power of an event is just the aggregate of the qualities that produced it [Hobbes]
The essence of whiteness in a man is nothing but the power to produce the idea of whiteness [Locke]
It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid]
Dispositions are physical states of mechanism; when known, these replace the old disposition term [Quine]
Basic powers may not be explained by structure, if at the bottom level there is no structure [Ellis]
Maybe dispositions can be explained by intrinsic properties or structures [Ellis]
I now deny that properties are cluster of powers, and take causal properties as basic [Shoemaker]
Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
Powers are not qualities; they just point to directions of empirical investigation [Harré/Madden]
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property? [Lewis]
All dispositions must have causal bases [Lewis]
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
Powers or dispositions are usually seen as caused by lower-level qualities [Heil]
Dispositions are classifications of properties by functional role [Mumford]
If dispositions have several categorical realisations, that makes the two separate [Mumford]
I say the categorical base causes the disposition manifestation [Mumford]
If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird]
The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird]
Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum]