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Single Idea 8556

[filed under theme 14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem ]

Full Idea

Grueness, as defined by Goodman, is not associated in the way greenness and blueness are with causal potentialities.

Gist of Idea

Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential

Source

Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §06)

Book Ref

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.219

A Reaction

Expressed rather more simply in Idea 7296. 'Grue' is a characteristic production of a predicate nominalist (i.e. Goodman), and that theory is just wrong. The account of properties must mesh with the account of induction.

Related Idea

Idea 7296 'Grue' is not a colour [Milsted]

The 33 ideas from 'Causality and Properties'

9485 Universals concern how things are, and how they could be [Shoemaker, by Bird]
12678 Shoemaker says all genuine properties are dispositional [Shoemaker, by Ellis]
8542 If causality is between events, there must be reference to the properties involved [Shoemaker]
8543 Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes [Shoemaker]
8545 A causal theory of properties focuses on change, not (say) on abstract properties of numbers [Shoemaker]
15756 Some truths are not because of a thing's properties, but because of the properties of related things [Shoemaker]
15758 Things have powers in virtue of (which are entailed by) their properties [Shoemaker]
8547 One power can come from different properties; a thing's powers come from its properties [Shoemaker]
15757 'Square', 'round' and 'made of copper' show that not all properties are dispositional [Shoemaker]
8548 Dispositional predicates ascribe powers, and the rest ascribe properties [Shoemaker]
8550 Triangular and trilateral are coextensive, but different concepts; but powers and properties are the same [Shoemaker]
15761 We should abandon the idea that properties are the meanings of predicate expressions [Shoemaker]
15759 The identity of a property concerns its causal powers [Shoemaker]
15760 Properties are clusters of conditional powers [Shoemaker]
8549 Properties are functions producing powers, and powers are functions producing effects [Shoemaker]
15762 Could properties change without the powers changing, or powers change without the properties changing? [Shoemaker]
8552 If properties are separated from causal powers, this invites total elimination [Shoemaker]
8551 Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them [Shoemaker]
8555 There is no subset of properties which guarantee a thing's identity [Shoemaker]
8554 Possible difference across worlds depends on difference across time in the actual world [Shoemaker]
8553 It looks as if the immutability of the powers of a property imply essentiality [Shoemaker]
8557 To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly [Shoemaker]
8556 Grueness is not, unlike green and blue, associated with causal potential [Shoemaker]
4040 The notions of property and of causal power are parts of a single system of related concepts [Shoemaker]
8558 One system has properties, powers, events, similarity and substance [Shoemaker]
8559 Analysis aims at internal relationships, not reduction [Shoemaker]
8560 If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
15763 If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
8561 If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
15764 'Conceivable' is either not-provably-false, or compatible with what we know? [Shoemaker]
8562 It is possible to conceive what is not possible [Shoemaker]
15765 Actually, properties are individuated by causes as well as effects [Shoemaker]
15092 Formerly I said properties are individuated by essential causal powers and causing instantiation [Shoemaker, by Shoemaker]