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Single Idea 8557
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
]
Full Idea
There is a plausible way of distinguishing genuine and mere-Cambridge properties. To decide whether an emerald is green the thing to do is to examine it, but a mere-Cambridge property is settled by observations at a remote time and place.
Clarification
Mere-Cambridge properties are usually whimsical and relational
Gist of Idea
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
Source
Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §06)
Book Ref
Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.220
A Reaction
Scientific essentialism is beautifully simple! Schoemaker is good at connecting the epistemology to the ontology. If you examined a mirror, you might think it contained reflections.
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[properties which constitute the natural world]:
7686
|
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist
[Aristotle, by Jacquette]
|
12673
|
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act
[Ellis]
|
13587
|
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
[Ellis]
|
15728
|
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects
[Quinton]
|
9407
|
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody
[Quinton]
|
8543
|
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
[Shoemaker]
|
8551
|
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
[Shoemaker]
|
8557
|
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
[Shoemaker]
|
15281
|
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected
[Harré/Madden]
|
14996
|
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
[Lewis]
|
15744
|
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15743
|
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
[Lewis]
|
15740
|
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
[Lewis]
|
15752
|
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
[Lewis]
|
16262
|
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness
[Lewis, by Maudlin]
|
15451
|
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
[Lewis]
|
10717
|
Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
16217
|
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity
[Lewis, by Hawley]
|
8613
|
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
[Lewis]
|
8585
|
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8586
|
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
[Lewis]
|
8589
|
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
[Lewis]
|
15460
|
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Lewis]
|
15726
|
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
[Lewis]
|
11916
|
'Being physical' is a second-order property
[Molnar]
|
4603
|
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
[Heil]
|
10417
|
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
[Swoyer]
|
14933
|
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them
[Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
|
16253
|
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect
[Maudlin]
|
14932
|
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations
[Ladyman/Ross]
|