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Single Idea 8560

[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity ]

Full Idea

To the extent that causal laws can be viewed as propositions describing the causal potentialities of properties, it is impossible that the same properties should be governed by different causal laws in different possible worlds.

Gist of Idea

If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds

Source

Sydney Shoemaker (Causality and Properties [1980], §08)

Book Ref

Shoemaker,Sydney: 'Identity, Cause and Mind' [OUP 2003], p.222

A Reaction

[He has just asserted that causal potentialities are essential to properties] This is the dramatic basic claim of scientific essentialism, which grows out of Shoemaker's causal account of properties. Note that the laws are just descriptions.

The 26 ideas with the same theme [natural necessity deriving from essences of kinds]:

11043 It is not possible for fire to be cold or snow black [Aristotle]
15966 Boyle and Locke believed corpuscular structures necessitate their powers of interaction [Locke, by Alexander,P]
15984 The corpuscular hypothesis is the best explanation of the necessary connection and co-existence of powers [Locke]
15950 We will only understand substance when we know the necessary connections between powers and qualities [Locke]
19669 For Kant the laws must be necessary, because contingency would destroy representation [Kant, by Meillassoux]
19672 Kant fails to prove the necessity of laws, because his reasoning about chance is over-ambitious [Meillassoux on Kant]
8933 Science confronts the inner necessities of objects [Hegel]
5818 If water is H2O in the actual world, there is no possible world where it isn't H2O [Putnam]
5464 For essentialists, laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, being based on essences of natural kinds [Ellis]
13603 A primary aim of science is to show the limits of the possible [Ellis]
8560 If causal laws describe causal potentialities, the same laws govern properties in all possible worlds [Shoemaker]
15763 If properties are causal, then causal necessity is a species of logical necessity [Shoemaker]
8561 If a world has different causal laws, it must have different properties [Shoemaker]
9387 The scientific discovery (if correct) that gold has atomic number 79 is a necessary truth [Kripke]
17054 Scientific discoveries about gold are necessary truths [Kripke]
17057 Once we've found that heat is molecular motion, then that's what it is, in all possible worlds [Kripke]
15223 Necessary effects will follow from some general theory specifying powers and structure of a world [Harré/Madden]
15241 Humeans say there is no necessity in causation, because denying an effect is never self-contradictory [Harré/Madden]
11957 It is contingent which kinds and powers exist in the world [Molnar]
14345 The necessity of an electron being an electron is conceptual, and won't ground necessary laws [Mumford]
9506 Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird]
19667 If the laws of nature are contingent, shouldn't we already have noticed it? [Meillassoux]
19670 Why are contingent laws of nature stable? [Meillassoux]
14548 There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum]
16977 If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
19038 Dispositional essentialism allows laws to be different, but only if the supporting properties differ [Vetter]