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Full Idea
One reason for denying that properties just are the meanings of our predicates is that, if they were, they could not give our predicates their meanings.
Gist of Idea
If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning
Source
D.H. Mellor (Properties and Predicates [1991], 'Props')
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.257
A Reaction
Neither way round sounds quite right to me. Predicate nominalism is wrong, but what is meant by a property 'giving' a predicate its meaning? It doesn't seem to allow room for error in our attempts to name the properties.
| 8564 | There is obviously a possible predicate for every property [Mellor] |
| 8566 | We need universals for causation and laws of nature; the latter give them their identity [Mellor] |
| 8565 | If properties were just the meanings of predicates, they couldn't give predicates their meaning [Mellor] |
| 8567 | Singular causation requires causes to raise the physical probability of their effects [Mellor] |
| 8568 | A property is merely a constituent of laws of nature; temperature is just part of thermodynamics [Mellor] |