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Single Idea 8569

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals ]

Full Idea

I suspend judgement about universals themselves; I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done.

Gist of Idea

I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done

Source

David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Intro')

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.188

A Reaction

This seems surprising (but admirable) in a great metaphysician, but I suppose it is symptomatic of the Humean approach to metaphysics. In the light of Ideas 3989 and 3990, I would have expected Lewis to deny universals. He probably did.

Related Ideas

Idea 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]

Idea 3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]

The 37 ideas with the same theme [single concepts applying to many things]:

11379 Substance is not a universal, as the former is particular but a universal is shared [Aristotle]
12096 Universals are indeterminate and only known in potential, because they are general [Aristotle, by Witt]
15034 Are genera and species real or conceptual? bodies or incorporeal? in sensibles or separate from them? [Porphyry]
5016 Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes]
6487 Locke, Berkeley and Hume did no serious thinking about universals [Robinson,H on Locke]
10533 We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett]
5383 Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell]
4428 Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell]
5406 Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell]
4479 All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux]
8495 The distinction between particulars and universals is a mistake made because of language [Ramsey]
8493 We could make universals collections of particulars, or particulars collections of their qualities [Ramsey]
1612 Realism, conceptualism and nominalism in medieval universals reappear in maths as logicism, intuitionism and formalism [Quine]
8506 Particulars and properties are distinguishable, but too close to speak of a relation [Armstrong]
4448 Should we decide which universals exist a priori (through words), or a posteriori (through science)? [Armstrong]
17678 Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong]
13573 Universals are all types of natural kind [Ellis]
13572 There are 'substantive' (objects of some kind), 'dynamic' (events of some kind) and 'property' universals [Ellis]
10532 We can understand universals by studying predication [Dummett]
10488 It is lunacy to think we only see ink-marks, and not word-types [Boolos]
15453 The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory [Lewis]
15746 If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle [Lewis]
15745 Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common [Lewis]
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8502 Realism doesn't explain 'a is F' any further by saying it is 'a has F-ness' [Devitt]
10472 'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
4477 Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
4481 Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
8288 Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe]
4197 The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
10402 Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
10318 Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale]
10511 It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale]
10521 If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale]
4451 If properties are universals, what distinguishes two things which have identical properties? [Moreland]
4453 One realism is one-over-many, which may be the model/copy view, which has the Third Man problem [Moreland]
4464 Realists see properties as universals, which are single abstract entities which are multiply exemplifiable [Moreland]