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Single Idea 8569

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals ]

Full Idea

I suspend judgement about universals themselves; I only insist that, one way or another, their work must be done.

Gist of Idea

I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done

Source

David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Intro')

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.188

A Reaction

This seems surprising (but admirable) in a great metaphysician, but I suppose it is symptomatic of the Humean approach to metaphysics. In the light of Ideas 3989 and 3990, I would have expected Lewis to deny universals. He probably did.

Related Ideas

Idea 3989 I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]

Idea 3990 The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]

The 33 ideas from 'New work for a theory of universals'

10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
8614 A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
8615 We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
15727 Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
8607 Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
8606 A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8611 A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]
8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
8581 Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
8579 Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
8580 Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]