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Single Idea 8570
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
]
Full Idea
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things. (Note: this resembles the doctrine of Class Nominalism, but I do not claim to solve the One Over Many problem by this means, far from it).
Gist of Idea
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things
Source
David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop')
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.189
A Reaction
Lewis remains neutral about the traditional question of whether universals exist. What does he mean by "is" in his assertion? Identity, predication or class membership? I think Lewis is open to many of the objections to Class Nominalism.
The
33 ideas
from 'New work for a theory of universals'
10717
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Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects
[Lewis, by Oliver]
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16217
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Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity
[Lewis, by Hawley]
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7031
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Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects
[Lewis, by Heil]
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21961
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Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist
[Lewis, by Moore,AW]
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14499
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Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars
[Lewis, by Koslicki]
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15120
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Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties
[Lewis, by Hawthorne]
|
8576
|
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
[Lewis]
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8605
|
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
[Lewis]
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8613
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Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
[Lewis]
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8585
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Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
[Lewis]
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8586
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Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
[Lewis]
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8589
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For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
[Lewis]
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8614
|
A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth
[Lewis]
|
8615
|
We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity
[Lewis]
|
8608
|
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
[Lewis]
|
15727
|
Physics aims for a list of natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8607
|
Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability
[Lewis]
|
8606
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A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation
[Lewis]
|
8569
|
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done
[Lewis]
|
8611
|
A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system
[Lewis]
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8584
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Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption
[Lewis]
|
8581
|
Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required
[Lewis]
|
8579
|
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism
[Lewis]
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8580
|
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically
[Lewis]
|
15460
|
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Lewis]
|
15726
|
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
[Lewis]
|
8571
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Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around
[Lewis]
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8572
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Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant
[Lewis]
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18433
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There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify
[Lewis]
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8604
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We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions
[Lewis]
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8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
[Lewis]
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8570
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To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things
[Lewis]
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8574
|
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same
[Lewis]
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