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Single Idea 8574

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism ]

Full Idea

Moderate Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism (in its present form) seem to me to be a single theory presented in different styles.

Gist of Idea

Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same

Source

David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Un and Prop' n9)

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.194


A Reaction

Lewis has earlier endorsed a cautious form of Class Nominalism (Idea 8570). Which comes first, having a resemblance, or being in a class? Quine seems to make resemblance basic (Idea 8486), but Lewis seems to make the class basic (Idea 8572).

Related Ideas

Idea 8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]

Idea 8486 Standards of similarity are innate, and the spacing of qualities such as colours can be mapped [Quine]

Idea 8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]


The 33 ideas from 'New work for a theory of universals'

Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]