more from this thinker
|
more from this text
Single Idea 8585
[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
]
Full Idea
Reference consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties.
Gist of Idea
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
Source
David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L')
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.220
A Reaction
This is a surprising conclusion for Lewis to reach, having started from properties as any old set members (see Idea 8572). There are references to intentional objects, such as 'there should have been someone on duty'.
Related Idea
Idea 8572
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
The
30 ideas
with the same theme
[properties which constitute the natural world]:
7686
|
For Aristotle, there are only as many properties as actually exist
[Aristotle, by Jacquette]
|
12673
|
Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act
[Ellis]
|
13587
|
There is no property of 'fragility', as things are each fragile in a distinctive way
[Ellis]
|
15728
|
The naturalness of a class depends as much on the observers as on the objects
[Quinton]
|
9407
|
Properties imply natural classes which can be picked out by everybody
[Quinton]
|
8543
|
Genuine properties are closely related to genuine changes
[Shoemaker]
|
8551
|
Properties must be essentially causal if we can know and speak about them
[Shoemaker]
|
8557
|
To ascertain genuine properties, examine the object directly
[Shoemaker]
|
15281
|
Humeans see predicates as independent, but science says they are connected
[Harré/Madden]
|
14996
|
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
[Lewis]
|
15744
|
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15743
|
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
[Lewis]
|
15740
|
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
[Lewis]
|
15752
|
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
[Lewis]
|
16262
|
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness
[Lewis, by Maudlin]
|
15451
|
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
[Lewis]
|
10717
|
Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
16217
|
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity
[Lewis, by Hawley]
|
8613
|
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
[Lewis]
|
8585
|
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8586
|
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
[Lewis]
|
8589
|
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
[Lewis]
|
15460
|
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Lewis]
|
15726
|
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
[Lewis]
|
11916
|
'Being physical' is a second-order property
[Molnar]
|
4603
|
Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws
[Heil]
|
10417
|
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured')
[Swoyer]
|
14933
|
Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them
[Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross]
|
16253
|
A property is fundamental if two objects can differ in only that respect
[Maudlin]
|
14932
|
Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations
[Ladyman/Ross]
|