more on this theme     |     more from this thinker

Single Idea 8585

[filed under theme 8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties ]

Full Idea

Reference consists in part of what we do in language or thought when we refer, but in part it consists in eligibility of the referent. And this eligibility to be referred to is a matter of natural properties.

Gist of Idea

Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties

Source

David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Cont of L')

Book Ref

'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.220

A Reaction

This is a surprising conclusion for Lewis to reach, having started from properties as any old set members (see Idea 8572). There are references to intentional objects, such as 'there should have been someone on duty'.

Related Idea

Idea 8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]

The 33 ideas from 'New work for a theory of universals'

10717 Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects [Lewis, by Oliver]
16217 Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity [Lewis, by Hawley]
7031 Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects [Lewis, by Heil]
21961 Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist [Lewis, by Moore,AW]
14499 Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars [Lewis, by Koslicki]
15120 Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties [Lewis, by Hawthorne]
8576 The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches) [Lewis]
8605 In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive [Lewis]
8613 Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated [Lewis]
8585 Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties [Lewis]
8586 Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains [Lewis]
8589 For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes [Lewis]
8614 A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth [Lewis]
8615 We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity [Lewis]
8608 Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past [Lewis]
15727 Physics aims for a list of natural properties [Lewis]
8607 Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability [Lewis]
8606 A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation [Lewis]
8569 I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done [Lewis]
8611 A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system [Lewis]
8584 Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption [Lewis]
8581 Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required [Lewis]
8579 Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism [Lewis]
8580 Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically [Lewis]
15460 All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic [Lewis, by Lewis]
15726 Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals [Lewis]
8571 Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around [Lewis]
8572 Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant [Lewis]
18433 There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify [Lewis]
8604 We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions [Lewis]
8573 Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones. [Lewis]
8570 To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things [Lewis]
8574 Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same [Lewis]