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Single Idea 8608
[filed under theme 26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / c. Counterfactual causation
]
Full Idea
A counterfactual can be said to 'backtrack' if it can be said that if the present were different a different past would have led up to it (rather than if the present were different, the same past would have had a different outcome).
Gist of Idea
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
Source
David Lewis (New work for a theory of universals [1983], 'Dup,Sup,Div')
Book Ref
'Properties', ed/tr. Mellor,D.H. /Oliver,A [OUP 1997], p.208
A Reaction
A nice clear definition of a concept which is important in Lewis's analysis of causation. In the current context he is concerned with elucidation of determinism and materialism. I would say (intuitively) that all counterfactuals backtrack.
The
324 ideas
from David Lewis
16456
|
For modality Lewis rejected boxes and diamonds, preferring worlds, and an index for the actual one
[Lewis, by Stalnaker]
|
18415
|
The actual world is just the world you are in
[Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
|
16392
|
A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property
[Lewis, by Recanati]
|
18416
|
Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties
[Lewis, by Solomon]
|
16390
|
Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time
[Lewis, by Recanati]
|
18418
|
A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent
[Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever]
|
4809
|
Lewis endorses the thesis that all explanation of singular events is causal explanation
[Lewis, by Psillos]
|
15552
|
We only pick 'the' cause for the purposes of some particular enquiry.
[Lewis]
|
15551
|
Ways of carving causes may be natural, but never 'right'
[Lewis]
|
15553
|
Causal dependence is counterfactual dependence between events
[Lewis]
|
14321
|
To explain an event is to provide some information about its causal history
[Lewis]
|
15554
|
A disposition needs a causal basis, a property in a certain causal role. Could the disposition be the property?
[Lewis]
|
15556
|
Science may well pursue generalised explanation, rather than laws
[Lewis]
|
15555
|
Explaining match lighting in general is like explaining one lighting of a match
[Lewis]
|
15558
|
A good explanation is supposed to show that the event had to happen
[Lewis]
|
15559
|
Does a good explanation produce understanding? That claim is just empty
[Lewis]
|
15557
|
Verisimilitude has proved hard to analyse, and seems to have several components
[Lewis]
|
15560
|
We can explain a chance event, but can never show why some other outcome did not occur
[Lewis]
|
9476
|
If dispositions are more fundamental than causes, then they won't conceptually reduce to them
[Bird on Lewis]
|
17524
|
Lewis has basic causation, counterfactuals, and a general ancestral (thus handling pre-emption)
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
17525
|
The counterfactual view says causes are necessary (rather than sufficient) for their effects
[Lewis, by Bird]
|
8397
|
Counterfactual causation implies all laws are causal, which they aren't
[Tooley on Lewis]
|
4795
|
Lewis's account of counterfactuals is fine if we know what a law of nature is, but it won't explain the latter
[Cohen,LJ on Lewis]
|
8405
|
A theory of causation should explain why cause precedes effect, not take it for granted
[Lewis, by Field,H]
|
10392
|
It is just individious discrimination to pick out one cause and label it as 'the' cause
[Lewis]
|
8420
|
A proposition is a set of possible worlds where it is true
[Lewis]
|
8419
|
The modern regularity view says a cause is a member of a minimal set of sufficient conditions
[Lewis]
|
8421
|
Regularity analyses could make c an effect of e, or an epiphenomenon, or inefficacious, or pre-empted
[Lewis]
|
8423
|
My counterfactual analysis applies to particular cases, not generalisations
[Lewis]
|
8424
|
Determinism says there can't be two identical worlds up to a time, with identical laws, which then differ
[Lewis]
|
8425
|
For true counterfactuals, both antecedent and consequent true is closest to actuality
[Lewis]
|
8426
|
One event causes another iff there is a causal chain from first to second
[Lewis]
|
8427
|
I reject making the direction of causation axiomatic, since that takes too much for granted
[Lewis]
|
14399
|
Presentism says only the present exists, so there is nothing for tensed truths to supervene on
[Lewis]
|
15545
|
Armstrong's analysis seeks truthmakers rather than definitions
[Lewis]
|
15546
|
Predications aren't true because of what exists, but of how it exists
[Lewis]
|
15548
|
Say 'truth is supervenient on being', but construe 'being' broadly
[Lewis]
|
15543
|
How do things combine to make states of affairs? Constituents can repeat, and fail to combine
[Lewis]
|
8433
|
There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards
[Lewis, by Horwich]
|
14361
|
Lewis says indicative conditionals are truth-functional
[Lewis, by Jackson]
|
8434
|
In good counterfactuals the consequent holds in world like ours except that the antecedent is true
[Lewis, by Horwich]
|
9419
|
A law of nature is a general axiom of the deductive system that is best for simplicity and strength
[Lewis]
|
16994
|
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart
[Kripke on Lewis]
|
11974
|
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do
[Lewis]
|
11975
|
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart
[Lewis]
|
11977
|
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts
[Lewis]
|
11976
|
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification
[Lewis]
|
11979
|
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election
[Lewis]
|
11978
|
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature
[Lewis]
|
15400
|
We must avoid circularity between what is intrinsic and what is natural
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
15458
|
A property is 'intrinsic' iff it can never differ between duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15457
|
Interdefinition is useless by itself, but if we grasp one separately, we have them both
[Lewis]
|
15459
|
Ellipsoidal stars seem to have an intrinsic property which depends on other objects
[Lewis]
|
15527
|
Defining terms either enables elimination, or shows that they don't require elimination
[Lewis]
|
15526
|
There is a method for defining new scientific terms just using the terms we already understand
[Lewis]
|
15528
|
A Ramsey sentence just asserts that a theory can be realised, without saying by what
[Lewis]
|
15529
|
It is better to have one realisation of a theory than many - but it may not always be possible
[Lewis]
|
15530
|
A logically determinate name names the same thing in every possible world
[Lewis]
|
15531
|
The Ramsey sentence of a theory says that it has at least one realisation
[Lewis]
|
12898
|
Justification is neither sufficient nor necessary for knowledge
[Lewis]
|
12895
|
Knowing is context-sensitive because the domain of quantification varies
[Lewis, by Cohen,S]
|
19562
|
We have knowledge if alternatives are eliminated, but appropriate alternatives depend on context
[Lewis, by Cohen,S]
|
12897
|
To say S knows P, but cannot eliminate not-P, sounds like a contradiction
[Lewis]
|
12899
|
The timid student has knowledge without belief, lacking confidence in their correct answer
[Lewis]
|
15562
|
Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence
[Lewis]
|
15561
|
The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation
[Lewis]
|
15564
|
An event is a property of a unique space-time region
[Lewis]
|
15563
|
Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables
[Lewis]
|
15565
|
Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence
[Lewis]
|
15566
|
Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts
[Lewis]
|
15567
|
Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges
[Lewis]
|
14979
|
Being alone doesn't guarantee intrinsic properties; 'being alone' is itself extrinsic
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
15454
|
Extrinsic properties come in degrees, with 'brother' less extrinsic than 'sibling'
[Lewis]
|
15455
|
Total intrinsic properties give us what a thing is
[Lewis]
|
15461
|
A 'finkish' disposition is real, but disappears when the stimulus occurs
[Lewis]
|
15462
|
Backtracking counterfactuals go from supposed events to their required causal antecedents
[Lewis]
|
15463
|
All dispositions must have causal bases
[Lewis]
|
15464
|
The distinction between dispositional and 'categorical' properties leads to confusion
[Lewis]
|
7441
|
Experiences are defined by their causal role, and causal roles belong to physical states
[Lewis]
|
7442
|
'Pain' contingently names the state that occupies the causal role of pain
[Lewis]
|
10847
|
Truthmakers are about existential grounding, not about truth
[Lewis]
|
10845
|
To be true a sentence must express a proposition, and not be ambiguous or vague or just expressive
[Lewis]
|
10846
|
Truthmaker is correspondence, but without the requirement to be one-to-one
[Lewis]
|
21461
|
I tried to be unsystematic and piecemeal, but failed; my papers presuppose my other views
[Lewis]
|
9426
|
The world is just a vast mosaic of little matters of local particular fact
[Lewis]
|
16210
|
Humean supervenience says the world is just a vast mosaic of qualities in space-time
[Lewis]
|
7443
|
A theory must be mixed, to cover qualia without behaviour, and behaviour without qualia
[Lewis, by PG]
|
7445
|
The application of 'pain' to physical states is non-rigid and contingent
[Lewis]
|
7444
|
Type-type psychophysical identity is combined with a functional characterisation of pain
[Lewis]
|
15539
|
Basic to pragmatics is taking a message in a way that makes sense of it
[Lewis]
|
15537
|
If cats are vague, we deny that the many cats are one, or deny that the one cat is many
[Lewis]
|
15536
|
We have one cloud, but many possible boundaries and aggregates for it
[Lewis]
|
15538
|
Semantic indecision explains vagueness (if we have precisifications to be undecided about)
[Lewis]
|
8209
|
Part of the folk concept of qualia is what makes recognition and comparison possible
[Lewis]
|
10808
|
Mathematics is generalisations about singleton functions
[Lewis]
|
10807
|
Mathematics reduces to set theory, which reduces, with some mereology, to the singleton function
[Lewis]
|
10806
|
Megethology is the result of adding plural quantification to mereology
[Lewis]
|
10809
|
We can accept the null set, but not a null class, a class lacking members
[Lewis]
|
10810
|
I say that absolutely any things can have a mereological fusion
[Lewis]
|
10811
|
The null set plays the role of last resort, for class abstracts and for existence
[Lewis]
|
10812
|
The null set is not a little speck of sheer nothingness, a black hole in Reality
[Lewis]
|
10813
|
What on earth is the relationship between a singleton and an element?
[Lewis]
|
10814
|
Are all singletons exact intrinsic duplicates?
[Lewis]
|
10815
|
We don't need 'abstract structures' to have structural truths about successor functions
[Lewis]
|
10816
|
We can use mereology to simulate quantification over relations
[Lewis]
|
15532
|
'Allists' embrace the existence of all controversial entities; 'noneists' reject all but the obvious ones
[Lewis]
|
15533
|
We can quantify over fictions by quantifying for real over their names
[Lewis]
|
15534
|
We could quantify over impossible objects - as bundles of properties
[Lewis]
|
15535
|
We can't accept a use of 'existence' that says only some of the things there are actually exist
[Lewis]
|
15452
|
We could not uphold a truthmaker for 'Fa' without structures
[Lewis]
|
15453
|
The main rivals to universals are resemblance or natural-class nominalism, or sparse trope theory
[Lewis]
|
3990
|
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth
[Lewis]
|
3989
|
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything
[Lewis]
|
3991
|
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction
[Lewis]
|
3992
|
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles
[Lewis]
|
3993
|
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe
[Lewis]
|
3994
|
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else
[Lewis]
|
3995
|
A mind is an organ of representation
[Lewis]
|
3996
|
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought
[Lewis]
|
3997
|
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority
[Lewis]
|
3998
|
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs
[Lewis]
|
3999
|
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs
[Lewis]
|
4000
|
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things
[Lewis]
|
7690
|
If sets exist, then defining worlds as proposition sets implies an odd distinction between existing and actual
[Jacquette on Lewis]
|
12255
|
For Lewis there is no real possibility, since all possibilities are actual
[Oderberg on Lewis]
|
9219
|
Lewis posits possible worlds just as Quine says that physics needs numbers and sets
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
15022
|
If possible worlds really exist, then they are part of actuality
[Sider on Lewis]
|
16441
|
Lewis rejects actualism because he identifies properties with sets
[Lewis, by Stalnaker]
|
14404
|
The counterpart relation is sortal-relative, so objects need not be a certain way
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
5440
|
A counterpart in a possible world is sufficiently similar, and more similar than anything else
[Lewis, by Mautner]
|
5441
|
Why should statements about what my 'counterpart' could have done interest me?
[Mautner on Lewis]
|
10470
|
There are only two kinds: sets, and possibilia (actual and possible particulars)
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
15399
|
The property of being F is identical with the set of objects, in all possible worlds, which are F
[Lewis, by Cameron]
|
9650
|
Supervenience concerns whether things could differ, so it is a modal notion
[Lewis]
|
16132
|
On mountains or in worlds, reporting contradictions is contradictory, so no such truths can be reported
[Lewis]
|
16133
|
Possible worlds can contain contradictions if such worlds are seen as fictions
[Lewis]
|
9651
|
Verisimilitude might be explained as being close to the possible world where the truth is exact
[Lewis]
|
9652
|
To just expect unexamined emeralds to be grue would be totally unreasonable
[Lewis]
|
9658
|
An explanation tells us how an event was caused
[Lewis]
|
15736
|
A proposition is the property of being a possible world where it holds true
[Lewis]
|
9654
|
A proposition is a set of entire possible worlds which instantiate a particular property
[Lewis]
|
15738
|
Propositions can't have syntactic structure if they are just sets of worlds
[Lewis]
|
9653
|
It would be easiest to take a property as the set of its instances
[Lewis]
|
15739
|
There is the property of belonging to a set, so abundant properties are as numerous as the sets
[Lewis]
|
15742
|
A disjunctive property can be unnatural, but intrinsic if its disjuncts are intrinsic
[Lewis]
|
14996
|
Natural properties give similarity, joint carving, intrinsicness, specificity, homogeneity...
[Lewis]
|
15743
|
Defining natural properties by means of laws of nature is potentially circular
[Lewis]
|
15744
|
We can't define natural properties by resemblance, if they are used to explain resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15751
|
Surely 'slept in by Washington' is a property of some bed?
[Lewis]
|
15735
|
Properties don't have degree; they are determinate, and things have varying relations to them
[Lewis]
|
9656
|
The 'abundant' properties are just any bizarre property you fancy
[Lewis]
|
15741
|
All of the natural properties are included among the intrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
15737
|
To be a 'property' is to suit a theoretical role
[Lewis]
|
15732
|
Properties don't seem to be sets, because different properties can have the same set
[Lewis]
|
15733
|
Accidentally coextensive properties come apart when we include their possible instances
[Lewis]
|
15734
|
If a property is relative, such as being a father or son, then set membership seems relative too
[Lewis]
|
10723
|
A property is the set of its actual and possible instances
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
15748
|
Trope theory needs a primitive notion for what unites some tropes
[Lewis]
|
15749
|
Trope theory (unlike universals) needs a primitive notion of being duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15750
|
Tropes need a similarity primitive, so they cannot be used to explain similarity
[Lewis]
|
9655
|
Trilateral and triangular seem to be coextensive sets in all possible worlds
[Lewis]
|
9657
|
You must accept primitive similarity to like tropes, but tropes give a good account of it
[Lewis]
|
15745
|
Universals recur, are multiply located, wholly present, make things overlap, and are held in common
[Lewis]
|
15746
|
If particles were just made of universals, similar particles would be the same particle
[Lewis]
|
15747
|
Universals aren't parts of things, because that relationship is transitive, and universals need not be
[Lewis]
|
15731
|
Quantification sometimes commits to 'sets', but sometimes just to pluralities (or 'classes')
[Lewis]
|
15740
|
I don't take 'natural' properties to be fixed by the nature of one possible world
[Lewis]
|
15752
|
We might try defining the natural properties by a short list of them
[Lewis]
|
9659
|
Causation is when at the closest world without the cause, there is no effect either
[Lewis]
|
10469
|
A world is a maximal mereological sum of spatiotemporally interrelated things
[Lewis]
|
8901
|
Abstraction is usually explained either by example, or conflation, or abstraction, or negatively
[Lewis]
|
8904
|
The Way of Abstraction says an incomplete description of a concrete entity is the complete abstraction
[Lewis]
|
8938
|
The Way of Example compares donkeys and numbers, but what is the difference, and what are numbers?
[Lewis]
|
8902
|
If abstractions are non-spatial, then both sets and universals seem to have locations
[Lewis]
|
8903
|
Abstracta can be causal: sets can be causes or effects; there can be universal effects; events may be sets
[Lewis]
|
8906
|
If we can abstract the extrinsic relations and features of objects, abstraction isn't universals or tropes
[Lewis]
|
8905
|
If universals or tropes are parts of things, then abstraction picks out those parts
[Lewis]
|
8907
|
The abstract direction of a line is the equivalence class of it and all lines parallel to it
[Lewis]
|
8908
|
For most sets, the concept of equivalence is too artificial to explain abstraction
[Lewis]
|
8909
|
Abstractions may well be verbal fictions, in which we ignore some features of an object
[Lewis]
|
9660
|
The impossible can be imagined as long as it is a bit vague
[Lewis]
|
16278
|
A particular functional role is what gives content to a thought
[Lewis]
|
16279
|
General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics
[Lewis]
|
9661
|
Induction is just reasonable methods of inferring the unobserved from the observed
[Lewis]
|
16280
|
Often explanaton seeks fundamental laws, rather than causal histories
[Lewis]
|
16274
|
If the well-ordering of a pack of cards was by shuffling, the explanation would make it more surprising
[Lewis]
|
16281
|
Honesty requires philosophical theories we can commit to with our ordinary commonsense
[Lewis]
|
11903
|
Extreme haecceitists could say I might have been a poached egg, but it is too remote to consider
[Lewis, by Mackie,P]
|
13793
|
An essential property is one possessed by all counterparts
[Lewis, by Elder]
|
16283
|
For me, all worlds are equal, with each being actual relative to itself
[Lewis]
|
16282
|
Ersatzers say we have one world, and abstract representations of how it might have been
[Lewis]
|
16284
|
Ersatz worlds represent either through language, or by models, or magically
[Lewis]
|
16286
|
Linguistic possible worlds need a complete supply of unique names for each thing
[Lewis]
|
16287
|
Maximal consistency for a world seems a modal distinction, concerning what could be true together
[Lewis]
|
9662
|
Linguistic possible worlds have problems of inconsistencies, no indiscernibles, and vocabulary
[Lewis]
|
16288
|
Analysis reduces primitives and makes understanding explicit (without adding new knowledge)
[Lewis]
|
16289
|
We can't account for an abstraction as 'from' something if the something doesn't exist
[Lewis]
|
16290
|
I believe in properties, which are sets of possible individuals
[Lewis]
|
15968
|
Identity is simple - absolutely everything is self-identical, and nothing is identical to another thing
[Lewis]
|
15969
|
Two things can never be identical, so there is no problem
[Lewis]
|
16291
|
In counterpart theory 'Humphrey' doesn't name one being, but a mereological sum of many beings
[Lewis]
|
9666
|
It is quite implausible that the future is unreal, as that would terminate everything
[Lewis]
|
9663
|
A thing 'perdures' if it has separate temporal parts, and 'endures' if it is wholly present at different times
[Lewis]
|
9664
|
Endurance is the wrong account, because things change intrinsic properties like shape
[Lewis]
|
9665
|
There are three responses to the problem that intrinsic shapes do not endure
[Lewis]
|
9667
|
Mereological composition is unrestricted: any class of things has a mereological sum
[Lewis]
|
15129
|
Haecceitism implies de re differences but qualitative identity
[Lewis]
|
9670
|
Extreme haecceitism says you might possibly be a poached egg
[Lewis]
|
9669
|
There are no free-floating possibilia; they have mates in a world, giving them extrinsic properties
[Lewis]
|
9057
|
Vagueness is semantic indecision: we haven't settled quite what our words are meant to express
[Lewis]
|
9671
|
Whether or not France is hexagonal depends on your standards of precision
[Lewis]
|
19280
|
I can ask questions which create a context in which origin ceases to be essential
[Lewis]
|
14737
|
Properties cannot be relations to times, if there are temporary properties which are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
13268
|
There are no restrictions on composition, because they would be vague, and composition can't be vague
[Lewis, by Sider]
|
16262
|
Sparse properties rest either on universals, or on tropes, or on primitive naturalness
[Lewis, by Maudlin]
|
15398
|
Global intrinsic may make necessarily coextensive properties both intrinsic or both extrinsic
[Cameron on Lewis]
|
15397
|
If a global intrinsic never varies between possible duplicates, all necessary properties are intrinsic
[Cameron on Lewis]
|
23019
|
The interesting time travel is when personal and external time come apart
[Lewis, by Baron/Miller]
|
23021
|
Lewis said it might just be that travellers to the past can't kill their grandfathers
[Lewis, by Baron/Miller]
|
10566
|
Lewis prefers giving up singletons to giving up sums
[Lewis, by Fine,K]
|
14244
|
Lewis only uses fusions to create unities, but fusions notoriously flatten our distinctions
[Oliver/Smiley on Lewis]
|
10191
|
Set theory reduces to a mereological theory with singletons as the only atoms
[Lewis, by MacBride]
|
18395
|
Sets are mereological sums of the singletons of their members
[Lewis, by Armstrong]
|
15496
|
We can build set theory on singletons: classes are then fusions of subclasses, membership is the singleton
[Lewis]
|
15497
|
We can replace the membership relation with the member-singleton relation (plus mereology)
[Lewis]
|
15500
|
Classes divide into subclasses in many ways, but into members in only one way
[Lewis]
|
15499
|
A subclass of a subclass is itself a subclass; a member of a member is not in general a member
[Lewis]
|
15498
|
We can accept the null set, but there is no null class of anything
[Lewis]
|
15501
|
We have no idea of a third sort of thing, that isn't an individual, a class, or their mixture
[Lewis]
|
15503
|
We needn't accept this speck of nothingness, this black hole in the fabric of Reality!
[Lewis]
|
15502
|
There are four main reasons for asserting that there is an empty set
[Lewis]
|
15504
|
Atomless gunk is an individual whose parts all have further proper parts
[Lewis]
|
15506
|
If we don't understand the singleton, then we don't understand classes
[Lewis]
|
15508
|
If singletons are where their members are, then so are all sets
[Lewis]
|
15507
|
Set theory has some unofficial axioms, generalisations about how to understand it
[Lewis]
|
15509
|
Some say qualities are parts of things - as repeatable universals, or as particulars
[Lewis]
|
15511
|
If singleton membership is external, why is an object a member of one rather than another?
[Lewis]
|
15512
|
In mereology no two things consist of the same atoms
[Lewis]
|
15513
|
Maybe singletons have a structure, of a thing and a lasso?
[Lewis]
|
15514
|
A huge part of Reality is only accepted as existing if you have accepted set theory
[Lewis]
|
15515
|
To be a structuralist, you quantify over relations
[Lewis]
|
15516
|
A property is any class of possibilia
[Lewis]
|
15517
|
Giving up classes means giving up successful mathematics because of dubious philosophy
[Lewis]
|
15518
|
I like plural quantification, but am not convinced of its connection with second-order logic
[Lewis]
|
15520
|
Existence doesn't come in degrees; once asserted, it can't then be qualified
[Lewis]
|
15519
|
Trout-turkeys exist, despite lacking cohesion, natural joints and united causal power
[Lewis]
|
15521
|
Given cats, a fusion of cats adds nothing further to reality
[Lewis]
|
15522
|
The one has different truths from the many; it is one rather than many, one rather than six
[Lewis]
|
14748
|
The many are many and the one is one, so they can't be identical
[Lewis]
|
15523
|
Set theory isn't innocent; it generates infinities from a single thing; but mathematics needs it
[Lewis]
|
15524
|
Zermelo's model of arithmetic is distinctive because it rests on a primitive of set theory
[Lewis]
|
15525
|
Plural quantification lacks a complete axiom system
[Lewis]
|
10660
|
A commitment to cat-fusions is not a further commitment; it is them and they are it
[Lewis]
|
6129
|
Lewis affirms 'composition as identity' - that an object is no more than its parts
[Lewis, by Merricks]
|
15789
|
Lewis's distinction of 'existing' from 'being actual' is Meinong's between 'existing' and 'subsisting'
[Lycan on Lewis]
|
15790
|
Lewis can't know possible worlds without first knowing what is possible or impossible
[Lycan on Lewis]
|
15791
|
What are the ontological grounds for grouping possibilia into worlds?
[Lycan on Lewis]
|
14283
|
A conditional probability does not measure the probability of the truth of any proposition
[Lewis, by Edgington]
|
4038
|
Properties are sets of their possible instances (which separates 'renate' from 'cordate')
[Lewis, by Mellor/Oliver]
|
9409
|
Laws are the best axiomatization of the total history of world events or facts
[Lewis, by Mumford]
|
9423
|
If simplicity and strength are criteria for laws of nature, that introduces a subjective element
[Mumford on Lewis]
|
9424
|
A number of systematizations might tie as the best and most coherent system
[Mumford on Lewis]
|
14209
|
Descriptive theories remain part of the theory of reference (with seven mild modifications)
[Lewis]
|
14215
|
Causal theories of reference make errors in reference easy
[Lewis]
|
14210
|
A gerrymandered mereological sum can be a mess, but still have natural joints
[Lewis]
|
14213
|
Anti-realists see the world as imaginary, or lacking joints, or beyond reference, or beyond truth
[Lewis]
|
14212
|
A consistent theory just needs one model; isomorphic versions will do too, and large domains provide those
[Lewis]
|
15540
|
You can't deny temporary intrinsic properties by saying the properties are relations (to times)
[Lewis]
|
15433
|
Tropes are particular properties, which cannot recur, but can be exact duplicates
[Lewis]
|
15448
|
The 'magical' view of structural universals says they are atoms, even though they have parts
[Lewis]
|
15449
|
If 'methane' is an atomic structural universal, it has nothing to connect it to its carbon universals
[Lewis]
|
15439
|
The 'pictorial' view of structural universals says they are wholes made of universals as parts
[Lewis]
|
15441
|
The structural universal 'methane' needs the universal 'hydrogen' four times over
[Lewis]
|
15440
|
A whole is distinct from its parts, but is not a further addition in ontology
[Lewis]
|
15443
|
Mathematicians abstract by equivalence classes, but that doesn't turn a many into one
[Lewis]
|
15450
|
Maybe abstraction is just mereological subtraction
[Lewis]
|
15451
|
I assume there could be natural properties that are not instantiated in our world
[Lewis]
|
15444
|
Different things (a toy house and toy car) can be made of the same parts at different times
[Lewis]
|
15446
|
Composition is not just making new things from old; there are too many counterexamples
[Lewis]
|
15445
|
Butane and Isobutane have the same atoms, but different structures
[Lewis]
|
15434
|
Structural universals have a necessary connection to the universals forming its parts
[Lewis]
|
15437
|
We can't get rid of structural universals if there are no simple universals
[Lewis]
|
15436
|
Universals are meant to give an account of resemblance
[Lewis]
|
15438
|
We can add a primitive natural/unnatural distinction to class nominalism
[Lewis]
|
15435
|
If you think universals are immanent, you must believe them to be sparse, and not every related predicate
[Lewis]
|
9425
|
Lewis later proposed the axioms at the intersection of the best theories (which may be few)
[Mumford on Lewis]
|
16079
|
De re modal predicates are ambiguous
[Lewis, by Rudder Baker]
|
14401
|
Every proposition is entirely about being
[Lewis]
|
15549
|
If it were true that nothing at all existed, would that have a truthmaker?
[Lewis]
|
16217
|
Lewisian natural properties fix reference of predicates, through a principle of charity
[Lewis, by Hawley]
|
10717
|
Natural properties figure in the analysis of similarity in intrinsic respects
[Lewis, by Oliver]
|
21961
|
Physics aims to discover which universals actually exist
[Lewis, by Moore,AW]
|
15120
|
Lewisian properties have powers because of their relationships to other properties
[Lewis, by Hawthorne]
|
14499
|
Properties are classes of possible and actual concrete particulars
[Lewis, by Koslicki]
|
7031
|
Lewis says properties are sets of actual and possible objects
[Lewis, by Heil]
|
8576
|
The One over Many problem (in predication terms) deserves to be neglected (by ostriches)
[Lewis]
|
8605
|
In addition to analysis of a concept, one can deny it, or accept it as primitive
[Lewis]
|
8615
|
We need natural properties in order to motivate the principle of charity
[Lewis]
|
8614
|
A sophisticated principle of charity sometimes imputes error as well as truth
[Lewis]
|
8585
|
Reference partly concerns thought and language, partly eligibility of referent by natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8613
|
Objects are demarcated by density and chemistry, and natural properties belong in what is well demarcated
[Lewis]
|
8586
|
Natural properties tend to belong to well-demarcated things, typically loci of causal chains
[Lewis]
|
8589
|
For us, a property being natural is just an aspect of its featuring in the contents of our attitudes
[Lewis]
|
8606
|
A supervenience thesis is a denial of independent variation
[Lewis]
|
8607
|
Supervenience is reduction without existence denials, ontological priorities, or translatability
[Lewis]
|
15727
|
Physics aims for a list of natural properties
[Lewis]
|
8608
|
Counterfactuals 'backtrack' if a different present implies a different past
[Lewis]
|
8569
|
I suspend judgements about universals, but their work must be done
[Lewis]
|
8584
|
Causal counterfactuals must avoid backtracking, to avoid epiphenomena and preemption
[Lewis]
|
8611
|
A law of nature is any regularity that earns inclusion in the ideal system
[Lewis]
|
8581
|
Physics discovers laws and causal explanations, and also the natural properties required
[Lewis]
|
8579
|
Psychophysical identity implies the possibility of idealism or panpsychism
[Lewis]
|
8580
|
Materialism is (roughly) that two worlds cannot differ without differing physically
[Lewis]
|
15460
|
All perfectly natural properties are intrinsic
[Lewis, by Lewis]
|
15726
|
Natural properties fix resemblance and powers, and are picked out by universals
[Lewis]
|
18433
|
There are far more properties than any brain could ever encodify
[Lewis]
|
8604
|
We need properties as semantic values for linguistic expressions
[Lewis]
|
8571
|
Universals are wholly present in their instances, whereas properties are spread around
[Lewis]
|
8570
|
To have a property is to be a member of a class, usually a class of things
[Lewis]
|
8572
|
Any class of things is a property, no matter how whimsical or irrelevant
[Lewis]
|
8573
|
Most properties are causally irrelevant, and we can't spot the relevant ones.
[Lewis]
|
8574
|
Class Nominalism and Resemblance Nominalism are pretty much the same
[Lewis]
|
16458
|
Semantic vagueness involves alternative and equal precisifications of the language
[Lewis]
|
4398
|
An event causes another just if the second event would not have happened without the first
[Lewis, by Psillos]
|