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Single Idea 8622
[filed under theme 18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
]
Full Idea
Defining concepts psychologically, in terms of the nature of the human mind, makes everything subjective, and if we follow it through to the end, does away with truth.
Gist of Idea
Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth
Source
Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884], Intro)
Book Ref
Frege,Gottlob: 'The Foundations of Arithmetic (Austin)', ed/tr. Austin,J.L. [Blackwell 1980], p.-5
A Reaction
This is the reason for Frege's passionate opposition to psychological approaches to thought. The problem, though, is to give an account in which the fixity of truth connects to the fluctuations of mental life. How does it do that??
The
20 ideas
with the same theme
[concepts as meanings, distinct from a word's reference]:
9839
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Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties
[Frege, by Dummett]
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9947
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Concepts are the ontological counterparts of predicative expressions
[Frege, by George/Velleman]
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10319
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An assertion about the concept 'horse' must indirectly speak of an object
[Frege, by Hale]
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8488
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A concept is a function whose value is always a truth-value
[Frege]
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9190
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A concept is a function mapping objects onto truth-values, if they fall under the concept
[Frege, by Dummett]
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13665
|
Frege took the study of concepts to be part of logic
[Frege, by Shapiro]
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13878
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Concepts are, precisely, the references of predicates
[Frege, by Wright,C]
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7736
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A concept is a non-psychological one-place function asserting something of an object
[Frege, by Weiner]
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17430
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Fregean concepts have precise boundaries and universal applicability
[Frege, by Koslicki]
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8622
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Psychological accounts of concepts are subjective, and ultimately destroy truth
[Frege]
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18752
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'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object
[Frege, by McGee]
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19168
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Concepts only have a 'functional character', because they map to truth values, not objects
[Dummett, by Davidson]
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11836
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We can use 'concept' for the reference, and 'conception' for sense
[Wiggins]
|
12637
|
Frege's puzzles suggest to many that concepts have sense as well as reference
[Fodor]
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12638
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If concepts have sense, we can't see the connection to their causal powers
[Fodor]
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12639
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Belief in 'senses' may explain intentionality, but not mental processes
[Fodor]
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12605
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A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference
[Peacocke]
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12607
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Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions
[Peacocke]
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13475
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The Fregean concept of GREEN is a function assigning true to green things, and false to the rest
[Hart,WD]
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22290
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The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated
[Potter]
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