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Full Idea
The 'Julius Caesar problem' in Frege's theory is that from within logic we cannot tell if an arbitrary objects such as Julius Caesar is a number or not. Logic itself cannot tell us enough to distinguish numbers from other sorts of objects.
Gist of Idea
From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number?
Source
report of Gottlob Frege (Grundlagen der Arithmetik (Foundations) [1884]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.4
Book Ref
Friend,Michèle: 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' [Acumen 2007], p.66
A Reaction
What a delightful problem (raised by Frege himself). A theory can look beautiful till you ask a question like this. Only a logician would, I suspect, get into this mess. Numbers can be used to count or order things! "I've got Caesar pencils"?
10232 | Property extensions outstrip objects, so shortage of objects caused the Caesar problem [Cantor, by Shapiro] |
10030 | 'Julius Caesar' isn't a number because numbers inherit properties of 0 and successor [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
8690 | From within logic, how can we tell whether an arbitrary object like Julius Caesar is a number? [Frege, by Friend] |
10219 | Frege said 2 is the extension of all pairs (so Julius Caesar isn't 2, because he's not an extension) [Frege, by Shapiro] |
13889 | Fregean numbers are numbers, and not 'Caesar', because they correlate 1-1 [Frege, by Wright,C] |
18142 | One-one correlations imply normal arithmetic, but don't explain our concept of a number [Frege, by Bostock] |
11030 | The words 'There are exactly Julius Caesar moons of Mars' are gibberish [Rumfitt on Frege] |
9046 | Our definition will not tell us whether or not Julius Caesar is a number [Frege] |
18143 | Frege makes numbers sets to solve the Caesar problem, but maybe Caesar is a set! [Bostock] |
13888 | If numbers are extensions, Frege must first solve the Caesar problem for extensions [Wright,C] |
8787 | The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright] |
18164 | Frege solves the Caesar problem by explicitly defining each number [Maddy] |
17997 | Some suggest that the Julius Caesar problem involves category mistakes [Magidor] |