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Single Idea 8692

[filed under theme 6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 5. Definitions of Number / d. Hume's Principle ]

Full Idea

Wright proposed removing Frege's basic law V (which led to paradox), replacing it with Frege's 'number principle' (identity of numbers is one-to-one correspondence). The new system is formally consistent, and the Peano axioms can be derived from it.

Clarification

See Idea 5897 for a simplified summary of Peano

Gist of Idea

Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V

Source

report of Crispin Wright (Frege's Concept of Numbers as Objects [1983]) by Michèle Friend - Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics 3.7

Book Ref

Friend,Michèle: 'Introducing the Philosophy of Mathematics' [Acumen 2007], p.71


A Reaction

The 'number principle' is also called 'Hume's principle'. This idea of Wright's resurrected the project of logicism. The jury is ought again... Frege himself questioned whether the number principle was a part of logic, which would be bad for 'logicism'.

Related Idea

Idea 5897 0 is a non-successor number, all successors are numbers, successors can't duplicate, if P(n) and P(n+1) then P(all-n) [Peano, by Flew]


The 19 ideas with the same theme [view that one-one correspondence is basis of numbers]:

Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume]
'The number of Fs' is the extension (a collection of first-level concepts) of the concept 'equinumerous with F' [Frege, by George/Velleman]
Frege's cardinals (equivalences of one-one correspondences) is not permissible in ZFC [Frege, by Wolf,RS]
Hume's Principle fails to implicitly define numbers, because of the Julius Caesar [Frege, by Potter]
Frege thinks number is fundamentally bound up with one-one correspondence [Frege, by Heck]
A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell]
Many things will satisfy Hume's Principle, so there are many interpretations of it [Bostock]
There are many criteria for the identity of numbers [Bostock]
Hume's Principle is a definition with existential claims, and won't explain numbers [Bostock]
We derive Hume's Law from Law V, then discard the latter in deriving arithmetic [Wright,C, by Fine,K]
Frege has a good system if his 'number principle' replaces his basic law V [Wright,C, by Friend]
Wright says Hume's Principle is analytic of cardinal numbers, like a definition [Wright,C, by Heck]
It is 1-1 correlation of concepts, and not progression, which distinguishes natural number [Wright,C]
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
If Hume's Principle can define numbers, we needn't worry about its truth [Fine,K]
Hume's Principle is either adequate for number but fails to define properly, or vice versa [Fine,K]
Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe]
Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe]
Frege's Theorem shows the Peano Postulates can be derived from Hume's Principle [George/Velleman]