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Single Idea 8776

[filed under theme 15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind ]

Full Idea

Abstractionists are unaware of the difficulty with relations - that they neither exist nor can be observed apart from the converse relation, the two being indivisible, as in grasping 'to the left of' and 'to the right of'.

Gist of Idea

We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too

Source

Peter Geach (Mental Acts: their content and their objects [1957], §9)

Book Ref

Geach,Peter: 'Mental Acts: Their content and their objects' [RKP 1971], p.33


A Reaction

It is hard to see how a rival account such as platonism could help. It seems obvious to me that 'right' and 'left' would be quite meaningless without some experience of things in space, including an orientation to them.


The 16 ideas from 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects'

You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]