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Single Idea 8786

[filed under theme 18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence ]

Full Idea

An example of a first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines; a higher-order example (which refers to first-order predicates) defines 'equinumeral' in terms of one-to-one correlation (Hume's Principle).

Gist of Idea

One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines

Source

B Hale / C Wright (Logicism in the 21st Century [2007], 1)

Book Ref

'Oxf Handbk of Philosophy of Maths and Logic', ed/tr. Shapiro,Stewart [OUP 2007], p.167


A Reaction

[compressed] This is the way modern logicians now treat abstraction, but abstraction principles include the elusive concept of 'equivalence' of entities, which may be no more than that the same adjective ('parallel') can be applied to them.


The 23 ideas from B Hale / C Wright

The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright]
The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright]
Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright]
Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright]
If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright]
Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright]
If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright]
The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright]
Neo-logicism founds arithmetic on Hume's Principle along with second-order logic [Hale/Wright]
One first-order abstraction principle is Frege's definition of 'direction' in terms of parallel lines [Hale/Wright]
Logicism might also be revived with a quantificational approach, or an abstraction-free approach [Hale/Wright]
The Julius Caesar problem asks for a criterion for the concept of a 'number' [Hale/Wright]
Logicism is only noteworthy if logic has a privileged position in our ontology and epistemology [Hale/Wright]
It is a fallacy to explain the obscure with the even more obscure [Hale/Wright]
Are neo-Fregeans 'maximalists' - that everything which can exist does exist? [Hale/Wright]
Neo-Fregeanism might be better with truth-makers, rather than quantifier commitment [Hale/Wright]
The identity of Pegasus with Pegasus may be true, despite the non-existence [Hale/Wright]
Abstractionism needs existential commitment and uniform truth-conditions [Hale/Wright]
Equivalence abstraction refers to objects otherwise beyond our grasp [Hale/Wright]
Reference needs truth as well as sense [Hale/Wright]
Maybe we have abundant properties for semantics, and sparse properties for ontology [Hale/Wright]
A successful predicate guarantees the existence of a property - the way of being it expresses [Hale/Wright]
Singular terms refer if they make certain atomic statements true [Hale/Wright]