more from this thinker     |     more from this text

Single Idea 8792

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique ]

Full Idea

Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'.

Gist of Idea

Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what

Source

Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)

Book Ref

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.123

A Reaction

This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference.

The 18 ideas with the same theme [criticisms of existence of foundational beliefs]:

16716 It is heresy to require self-evident foundational principles in order to be certain [Anon (Par)]
2235 There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume]
5541 A sufficient but general sign of truth cannot possibly be provided [Kant]
10486 If we are rebuilding our ship at sea, we should jettison some cargo [Boolos on Neurath]
8485 We must always rebuild our ship on the open sea; we can't reconstruct it properly in dry-dock [Neurath]
8792 Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars]
8802 Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson]
8825 It seems impossible to logically deduce physical knowledge from indubitable sense data [Kim]
8799 If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
8795 Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
2523 That every mammal has a mother is a secure reality, but without foundations [Dennett]
3699 The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour]
2753 Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
3577 Strong justification eliminates error, but also reduces our true beliefs [Williams,M]
3576 Foundationalists are torn between adequacy and security [Williams,M]
6363 Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz]
3754 Infallible sensations can't be foundations if they are non-epistemic [Bernecker/Dretske]
10339 Foundations seem utterly private, even from oneself at a later time [Kusch]