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Full Idea
Observational knowledge of any particular fact, e.g. that this is green, presupposes that one knows general facts of the form 'X is a reliable symptom of Y'.
Gist of Idea
Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what
Source
Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.123
A Reaction
This is a nicely observed version of the regress problem with justification. I would guess that foundationalists would simply deny that this further knowledge is required; 'this is green' arises out of the experience, but it is not an inference.
| 6382 | The 'grain problem' says physical objects are granular, where sensations appear not to be [Sellars, by Polger] |
| 8791 | The concept of 'green' involves a battery of other concepts [Sellars] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8792 | Observations like 'this is green' presuppose truths about what is a reliable symptom of what [Sellars] |
| 6550 | Reduction requires that an object's properties consist of its constituents' properties and relations [Sellars] |
| 21829 | Philosophy aims to understand how things (broadly understood) hang together (broadly understood) [Sellars] |