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Full Idea
In characterizing an observational episode or state as 'knowing', we are not giving an empirical description of it; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says.
Gist of Idea
If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons
Source
Wilfrid Sellars (Does Emp.Knowledge have Foundation? [1956], p.123)
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.123
A Reaction
McDowell has made the Kantian phrase 'the logical space of reasons' very popular. This is a very nice statement of the internalist view of justification, with which I sympathise more and more. It is a rationalist coherentist view. It needn't be mystical!
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |