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Single Idea 8798

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification ]

Full Idea

Visual experience is recognized as both the cause and the justification of our visual beliefs. But these are not wholly independent. Presumably the justification that something is red derives partly from the fact that it originates in visual experience.

Gist of Idea

Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification

Source

Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §10)

Book Ref

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.146

A Reaction

Yes, but the fact that certain visual experiences originate in dreams is taken as grounds for denying their truth, not affirming it. So why do we distinguish them? I am thinking that only in the 'space of reasons' can a cause become a justification.

The 14 ideas with the same theme [justification needs a causal link from facts to beliefs]:

11052 Psychological logic can't distinguish justification from causes of a belief [Frege]
3790 Causes of beliefs are irrelevant to their contents [Wittgenstein]
3832 Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle]
8798 Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
16279 General causal theories of knowledge are refuted by mathematics [Lewis]
3795 Causal theories require the "right" sort of link (usually unspecified) [Dennett]
2746 How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
2747 Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
3569 In the causal theory of knowledge the facts must cause the belief [Williams,M]
3567 How could there be causal relations to mathematical facts? [Williams,M]
3586 Only a belief can justify a belief [Williams,M]
3898 My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton]
6358 One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz]
10350 Cultures decide causal routes, and they can be critically assessed [Kusch]