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Single Idea 8799

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique ]

Full Idea

If a mental state is not propositional, then how can it possibly serve as a foundation for belief? How can one infer or justify anything on the basis of a state that, having no propositional content, must be logically dumb?

Gist of Idea

If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations

Source

Ernest Sosa (The Raft and the Pyramid [1980], §11)

Book Ref

'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.148


A Reaction

This may be the best objection to foundationalism. McDowell tries to argue that conceptual content is inherent in perception, thus giving the beginnings of inbuilt propositional content. But an organism awash with bare experiences knows nothing.


The 6 ideas from 'The Raft and the Pyramid'

Vision causes and justifies beliefs; but to some extent the cause is the justification [Sosa]
If mental states are not propositional, they are logically dumb, and cannot be foundations [Sosa]
There are very few really obvious truths, and not much can be proved from them [Sosa]
Mental states cannot be foundational if they are not immune to error [Sosa]
A single belief can trail two regresses, one terminating and one not [Sosa]
The negation of all my beliefs about my current headache would be fully coherent [Sosa]