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Single Idea 8801
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
]
Full Idea
What distinguishes a coherence theory of justification is simply the claim that nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief.
Gist of Idea
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs
Source
Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.156)
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.156
A Reaction
I think I agree fully with this. Red patches and headaches I count as evidence rather than as reasons. Since a red patch can be hallucinatory, and a headache can be dreamed, they can't possibly embody true propositions without critical evaluation.
The
31 ideas
with the same theme
[proposal that coherent support creates knowledge]:
22109
|
The fullest knowledge places a conclusion within an accurate theory
[Aquinas, by Kretzmann/Stump]
|
15977
|
Facts beyond immediate experience are assessed by agreement with known truths and observations
[Locke]
|
7070
|
Kant says knowledge is when our representations sufficiently conform to our concepts
[Kant, by Critchley]
|
22058
|
Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them
[Hegel, by Bowie]
|
23029
|
Knowledge is secured by the relations between its parts, through differences and identities
[Green,TH, by Muirhead]
|
23034
|
The ultimate test for truth is the systematic interdependence in nature
[Green,TH, by Muirhead]
|
17639
|
Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions
[Russell]
|
8801
|
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs
[Davidson]
|
19311
|
In revision of belief, we need to keep track of justifications for foundations, but not for coherence
[Harman]
|
19312
|
Coherence is intelligible connections, especially one element explaining another
[Harman]
|
6369
|
In negative coherence theories, beliefs are prima facie justified, and don't need initial reasons
[Harman, by Pollock/Cruz]
|
9329
|
Justification is coherence with a background system; if irrefutable, it is knowledge
[Lehrer]
|
8839
|
Reasons acquire warrant through being part of a lengthening series
[Klein,P]
|
2773
|
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism
[Dancy,J]
|
2779
|
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists
[Dancy,J]
|
2786
|
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things
[Dancy,J]
|
21506
|
A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth
[Bonjour]
|
21509
|
There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems
[Bonjour]
|
21503
|
Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience
[Bonjour]
|
19513
|
A contextualist coherentist will say that how strongly a justification must cohere depends on context
[DeRose]
|
6365
|
Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem
[Pollock/Cruz]
|
17700
|
The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another
[Mares]
|
10331
|
Testimony is reliable if it coheres with evidence for a belief, and with other beliefs
[Kusch]
|
10338
|
The coherentist restricts the space of reasons to the realm of beliefs
[Kusch]
|
4723
|
Coherence involves support from explanation and evidence, and also probability and confirmation
[O'Grady]
|
6596
|
For coherentists, circularity is acceptable if the circle is large, rich and coherent
[Fogelin]
|
21515
|
Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence
[Olsson]
|
21514
|
Coherence is the capacity to answer objections
[Olsson]
|
8843
|
Impure coherentists accept that perceptions can justify, unlike pure coherentists
[Pryor]
|
8844
|
Coherentism rests on the claim that justifications must be beliefs, with propositional content
[Pryor]
|
8618
|
Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction)
[Elgin]
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