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Full Idea
We must find a reason for supposing most of our beliefs are true that is not a form of evidence.
Gist of Idea
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence
Source
Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.158)
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.158
A Reaction
This simple observation strikes me as being a key truth in epistemology. It is the same confusion that creates Jackson's Knowledge Argument (Idea 7377) against physicalism (that experiencing red can be thought to be knowledge).
Related Idea
Idea 7377 Mary learns when she sees colour, so her complete physical information had missed something [Jackson]
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |