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Single Idea 8806
[filed under theme 11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / b. Elements of beliefs
]
Full Idea
Knowing what a belief is brings with it the concept of objective truth, for the notion of a belief is the notion of a state that may or may not jibe with reality.
Gist of Idea
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality
Source
Donald Davidson (Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge [1983], p.162)
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.162
A Reaction
I find any discussion of belief that makes no reference to truth (as in Hume) quite puzzling. I can understand it when a belief is just triggered by a sensation ('this is hot'), but not when a belief arrives after careful comparison of reasons.
The
159 ideas
from Donald Davidson
7949
|
Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it
[Davidson, by Macdonald,C]
|
20020
|
If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action
[Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20072
|
We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
20075
|
Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
3395
|
Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
23734
|
The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal
[Davidson, by Smith,M]
|
23737
|
Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them
[Smith,M on Davidson]
|
6664
|
Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
20045
|
Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate
[Davidson]
|
10371
|
Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions
[Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
8403
|
Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events
[Field,H on Davidson]
|
4778
|
A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law
[Davidson, by Psillos]
|
8346
|
Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity
[Davidson]
|
8347
|
Explanations typically relate statements, not events
[Davidson]
|
8348
|
If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk
[Davidson]
|
8349
|
The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk
[Davidson]
|
19081
|
Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds
[Davidson, by Donnellan]
|
8255
|
Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally
[McDowell on Davidson]
|
18703
|
Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right'
[Davidson, by Button]
|
8252
|
Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons
[Davidson, by McDowell]
|
8801
|
Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs
[Davidson]
|
8802
|
Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them
[Davidson]
|
8804
|
Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence
[Davidson]
|
8805
|
Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects
[Davidson]
|
8806
|
The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality
[Davidson]
|
19044
|
Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true
[Davidson]
|
6398
|
Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background
[Davidson]
|
6399
|
Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes
[Davidson]
|
6400
|
Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism
[Davidson]
|
7331
|
A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic
[Davidson, by Macey]
|
8872
|
It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority
[Davidson]
|
8873
|
The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant?
[Davidson]
|
8874
|
It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content
[Davidson]
|
23294
|
It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge
[Davidson]
|
23295
|
Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler
[Davidson]
|
23296
|
We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts
[Davidson]
|
23297
|
The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite
[Davidson]
|
23298
|
Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory
[Davidson]
|
19698
|
Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed
[Davidson, by Neta]
|
9843
|
You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first
[Dummett on Davidson]
|
18914
|
Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events
[Davidson, by Engelbretsen]
|
8278
|
The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular
[Lowe on Davidson]
|
14602
|
Events can only be individuated causally
[Davidson, by Schaffer,J]
|
14004
|
We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs
[Davidson, by Bourne]
|
20024
|
Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive
[Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall]
|
20076
|
An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable
[Davidson]
|
6383
|
Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate
[Davidson]
|
6384
|
The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will
[Davidson]
|
6385
|
The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best
[Davidson]
|
6175
|
External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn
[Davidson, by Rowlands]
|
7771
|
We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
15002
|
If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events
[Davidson, by Sider]
|
8860
|
Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events
[Yablo on Davidson]
|
6386
|
In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences
[Davidson]
|
3429
|
Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
6620
|
Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation
[Davidson, by Lowe]
|
2307
|
Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
5497
|
Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
4081
|
Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties
[Davidson, by Crane]
|
2321
|
If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible?
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3404
|
Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3529
|
Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
3405
|
If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties
[Davidson, by Kim]
|
3524
|
Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
3526
|
Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described
[Davidson, by Maslin]
|
16041
|
Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical
[Davidson]
|
4983
|
There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene
[Davidson]
|
7775
|
Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules
[Davidson]
|
7776
|
Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean
[Davidson]
|
7777
|
We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false
[Davidson]
|
4041
|
Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain
[Davidson]
|
4042
|
Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time
[Davidson]
|
3960
|
There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties
[Davidson]
|
3961
|
Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events
[Davidson]
|
3965
|
Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world
[Davidson]
|
3966
|
The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism
[Davidson]
|
3964
|
If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible
[Davidson]
|
3963
|
There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events
[Davidson]
|
3962
|
Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws
[Davidson]
|
3967
|
Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought
[Davidson]
|
3968
|
Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them
[Davidson]
|
3969
|
There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard
[Davidson]
|
3972
|
Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean
[Davidson]
|
3970
|
Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others
[Davidson]
|
3971
|
There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do
[Davidson]
|
3973
|
Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless
[Davidson]
|
3974
|
Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant
[Davidson]
|
20074
|
We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions
[Davidson, by Stout,R]
|
6387
|
A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth
[Davidson]
|
6388
|
Is reference the key place where language and the world meet?
[Davidson]
|
6389
|
To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically
[Davidson]
|
6390
|
With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language
[Davidson]
|
6391
|
A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible
[Davidson]
|
18702
|
Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling
[Davidson]
|
15160
|
Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead
[Davidson, by Soames]
|
14612
|
Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic
[Davidson, by Smart]
|
18902
|
Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to
[Davidson]
|
6394
|
The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning
[Davidson]
|
6395
|
An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use
[Davidson]
|
11144
|
Concepts are only possible in a language community
[Davidson]
|
11145
|
Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken
[Davidson]
|
6396
|
A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief
[Davidson]
|
6397
|
The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community
[Davidson]
|
6392
|
Thought depends on speech
[Davidson]
|
6393
|
A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech
[Davidson]
|
10346
|
Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world
[Davidson, by Dummett]
|
10347
|
Objectivity is intersubjectivity
[Davidson]
|
8866
|
If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me
[Davidson]
|
8867
|
A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality
[Davidson]
|
8868
|
Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication
[Davidson]
|
8869
|
The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers
[Davidson]
|
8870
|
Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds
[Davidson]
|
8188
|
Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences
[Davidson, by Dummett]
|
6179
|
Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around?
[Blackburn on Davidson]
|
7327
|
Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning
[Davidson, by Miller,A]
|
7772
|
Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
7769
|
You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time
[Davidson, by Lycan]
|
7332
|
There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form
[Davidson]
|
19132
|
Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage
[Davidson]
|
19133
|
If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole
[Davidson]
|
19131
|
We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts
[Davidson]
|
19136
|
Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning
[Davidson]
|
19139
|
Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common
[Davidson]
|
19147
|
Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language
[Davidson]
|
19150
|
Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief
[Davidson]
|
19148
|
There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to
[Davidson]
|
19145
|
We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth
[Davidson]
|
19146
|
Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference?
[Davidson]
|
19144
|
'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify
[Davidson]
|
19140
|
'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference
[Davidson]
|
19151
|
Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard
[Davidson]
|
19142
|
Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature
[Davidson]
|
19149
|
If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations'
[Davidson]
|
19152
|
Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker
[Davidson]
|
19154
|
The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants
[Davidson]
|
19153
|
Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler
[Davidson]
|
19156
|
Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places
[Davidson]
|
19158
|
'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human'
[Davidson]
|
19162
|
Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed
[Davidson]
|
19161
|
We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth
[Davidson]
|
19163
|
You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it
[Davidson]
|
19166
|
The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence
[Davidson]
|
19167
|
Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing
[Davidson]
|
19160
|
A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication
[Davidson]
|
19170
|
Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote
[Davidson]
|
19172
|
To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language
[Davidson]
|
19174
|
Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths
[Davidson]
|
19169
|
Predicates are a source of generality in sentences
[Davidson]
|
19176
|
The concept of truth can explain predication
[Davidson]
|
19173
|
Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help
[Davidson]
|
23287
|
Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language
[Davidson]
|
23288
|
When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept?
[Davidson]
|
23289
|
Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding
[Davidson]
|
23290
|
It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions
[Davidson]
|
23291
|
Without truth, both language and thought are impossible
[Davidson]
|
23292
|
Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world
[Davidson]
|
23284
|
Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true
[Davidson]
|
23285
|
If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves)
[Davidson]
|
23286
|
Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it
[Davidson]
|