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Full Idea
It might be wondered why we even have a concept of truth. The answer is that this concept is required for defeasible reasoning.
Clarification
Willingness to change is the mark of 'defeasible'
Gist of Idea
We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning
Source
John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach')
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.214
A Reaction
His point is that we must be able to think critically about our beliefs ('is p true?') if we are to have any knowledge at all. An excellent point. Give that man a teddy bear.
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |