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Full Idea
Rather than truth being fundamental and rules for reasoning being derived from it, the rules for reasoning come first and truth is characterized by the rules for reasoning about truth.
Gist of Idea
Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it
Source
John L. Pollock (Epistemic Norms [1986], 'Cog.Mach')
Book Ref
'Epistemology - An Anthology', ed/tr. Sosa,E. /Kim,J. [Blackwell 2000], p.215
A Reaction
This nicely disturbs our complacency about such things. There is plenty of reasoning in Homer, but I bet there is no talk of 'truth'. Pontius Pilate seems to have been a pioneer (Idea 8821). Do the truth tables define or describe logical terms?
Related Idea
Idea 8821 Jesus said he bore witness to the truth. Pilate asked, What is truth? [John]
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |