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Single Idea 8845
[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
]
Full Idea
To say that experiences have propositional content is not to say that experiences are beliefs.
Gist of Idea
An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief
Source
James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §4)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.188
A Reaction
This is important for opponents of foundationalism, because they will not allow a raw experience to act as a justification on its own. Even if concepts, or even propositions, are offered by experience, the crucial evaluation must preceded knowledge.
The
15 ideas
with the same theme
[contents and origin of foundational beliefs]:
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1670
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When you understand basics, you can't be persuaded to change your mind
[Aristotle]
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20795
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Some things are their own criterion, such as straightness, a set of scales, or light
[Sext.Empiricus]
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5004
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We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round
[Descartes]
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23245
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Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities
[Fichte]
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6944
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Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt
[Peirce]
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4257
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The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible
[Bonjour]
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2756
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If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom
[Dancy,J]
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8896
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Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct
[Bonjour]
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8853
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Basic judgements are immune from error because they have no content
[Williams,M]
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3580
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Experience must be meaningful to act as foundations
[Williams,M]
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6353
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People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations
[Pollock/Cruz]
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6361
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Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility
[Pollock/Cruz]
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4582
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Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed
[Baggini /Fosl]
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8845
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An experience's having propositional content doesn't make it a belief
[Pryor]
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19719
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'Moderate' foundationalism has basic justification which is defeasible
[Grundmann]
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