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Single Idea 8846

[filed under theme 13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism ]

Full Idea

If you have reasons for your belief, they should be considerations you could in principle cite, or give, to someone who doubted or challenged the belief. You can't give some else a non-propositional state like a headache.

Gist of Idea

Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience

Source

James Pryor (There is immediate Justification [2005], §6)

Book Ref

'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.193


A Reaction

On the whole I agree, but if someone asked you to justify your claim that there is a beautiful sunset over the harbour, you could just say 'Look!'. Headaches are too private. The person must still see that the sunset is red, and not the window.


The 18 ideas with the same theme [reasons in favour of the coherentist view]:

A rational account of a wagon would mean knowledge of its hundred parts [Plato]
Encounters with things confuse the mind, and internal comparisons bring clarity [Spinoza]
Scientific truths are supported by mutual agreement, as well as agreement with the phenomena [Leibniz]
If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid]
We find satisfaction in consistency of all of our beliefs, perceptions and mental connections [James]
Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell]
Congruents assertions increase the probability of each individual assertion in the set [Lewis,CI]
We can no more expect a precise definition of coherence than we can of the moral ideal [Ewing]
Discovery is often just finding a fit, like a jigsaw puzzle [Goodman]
Coherence avoids scepticism, because it doesn't rely on unprovable foundations [Harman]
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour]
The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour]
A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour]
The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour]
Bayesians build near-certainty from lots of reasonably probable beliefs [Sorensen]
As science investigates more phenomena, the theories it needs decreases [Bird]
Reasons for beliefs can be cited to others, unlike a raw headache experience [Pryor]