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Full Idea
The fact that experiential contents cannot be other than they are, as far as sensory awareness goes, does not imply that we cannot misdescribe them, as in misreporting the number of speckles on a speckled hen (Chisholm's example).
Gist of Idea
Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed
Source
Michael Williams (Without Immediate Justification [2005], §4)
Book Ref
'Contemporary Debates in Epistemology', ed/tr. Steup,M/Sosa,E [Blackwell 2005], p.213
A Reaction
[Chisholm 1942 is cited] Such experiences couldn't be basic beliefs if there was a conflict between their intrinsic nature and the description I used in discussing them.
| 5697 | The only possible standard for settling doubts is the foundation of the senses [Lucretius] |
| 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
| 5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
| 5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
| 8793 | If observation is knowledge, it is not just an experience; it is a justification in the space of reasons [Sellars] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8855 | Sensory experience may be fixed, but it can still be misdescribed [Williams,M] |
| 3578 | Are empirical foundations judgements or experiences? [Williams,M] |
| 8875 | Sense experiences must have conceptual content, since they are possible reasons for judgements [Brewer,B] |